

11/13/15
serial 28

-1-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

Date of transcription 11/09/2015

On October 29, 2015, at approximately 2:15 PM [redacted] US Department of State, met with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) [redacted] provided SA [redacted] with the following item:

- HP dc5850 desktop computer, S/N 2UA9261HHK

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Attached to this communication as a 1A is the FD-597 Receipt for Property, signed by [redacted] listing the above item and a State Department Property Transaction form.

Investigation on 10/29/2015 at Washington, D.C.

b3

File # [redacted] 302 - 28 Date dictated N/A

b6

b7C

b7E

By : SA [redacted] 11/9/2015

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

HRC-1043

6/9/14
Serial 75

b6
b7c

HRC-1067

~~(SECRET//NOFORN)~~

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

-1-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b1 per CIA
b3 per CIA
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI
Date of transcription 5/19/2016

(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ This is a placeholder document for the FD-302a documenting the May 17, 2016, interview of [redacted] by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] in McLean, Virginia.

(U//FOUO) The full FD-302a is housed in the sub [redacted] file of the captioned investigation due to the classification level of the content discussed during the interview. (S)

b1 per CIA
b3 per CIA
b7E per FBI

Investigation on 5/17/2016 at McLean, VA

b3
b7E

File # [redacted]-302 - 75 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted]

b6
b7C

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~~(SECRET//NOFORN)~~

HRC-1068

6/7/16
Serial 76

b6 per
b7C FBI

~~(SECRET//NOFORN)~~

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

-1-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/20/2016 b1 per CIA
b3 per CIA
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

(S)

~~(S//NF)~~ This is a placeholder document for the FD-302a documenting the May 19, 2016, interview of [redacted] by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] in McLean, Virginia.

(U//FOUO) The full FD-302a is housed in the sub [redacted] file of the captioned investigation due to the classification level of the content discussed during the interview. (S)

b1 per CIA
b3 per CIA
b7E per FBI

Investigation on 5/19/2016 at McLean, VA
File # [redacted] 302-76 Date dictated N/A
By SA [redacted]

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

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~~(SECRET//NOFORN)~~

HRC-1070

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

Prespro

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WF

Serial # of Originating Document

29

Date Received

10-29-15

From

[Redacted]

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

DS/DOS

(Address)

Arlington VA

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

To Be Returned

☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given

☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Title:

Midyear Exam

Reference:

Steven Mui Production Response

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☐

Original notes re interview of

3 printed emails

Cd titled "Files to Disk"

HRC-1340

-1-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/15/2016

On 1/15/2016, SA [] located 4 CDs associated with [] **PRESPRO**
Serial 29, located in 1A 21 Volumes 7, 8, 9, and 11. Said CDs were referenced in Serial 29 as follows:

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[] 1 CD labeled Unclassified and titled [] FBI Request memo Oct 6, 2015.
Clinton email

Stephen D. Mull - 1 CD labeled Unclassified and titled "Files to Disk"

[] - 1 CD labeled Unclassified and titled [] WR - Clinton Email PST" b6
b7C

Patrick F. Kennedy - 1 CD labeled Unclassified and titled "U/S P. Kennedy PST."

The aforementioned CDs were removed from their corresponding 1A envelopes by SA []
[] on 1/15/2016 and submitted to Evidence for further analytical processing/review.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 1/15/2016 at Washington, DC

b3

File # [] **PRESPRO** Date dictated N/A

b6

b7C

b7E

By SA []

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

HRC-1341

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

C. 20520

www.state.gov

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Stephen Mill
S/INI



Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Office of Assistant Secretary
HST, Room 6316

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Mull, Stephen D

From: Mull, Stephen D
Sent: Thursday, November 29, 2012 12:15 AM
To: Greene, Douglas C; [REDACTED]
Subject: Fw: Sikorski in Brussels

b6
b7C

Fyi

----- Original Message -----

From: Abedin, Huma
To: Noyes, Julieta Valls; Sullivan, Jacob J; 'huma@clintonemail.com' <huma@clintonemail.com>; Mull, Stephen D; Gordon, Philip H
Cc: Palmieri, Francisco L; [REDACTED]
Sent: Thu Nov 29 04:43:30 2012
Subject: Re: Sikorski in Brussels

b6
b7C

We gave phil confirmation that bilat in brussels was still on. Doesn't affect tomorrow.

----- Original Message -----

From: Noyes, Julieta Valls
Sent: Wednesday, November 28, 2012 05:39 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; 'Huma@clintonemail.com' <Huma@clintonemail.com>; Abedin, Huma
Cc: Palmieri, Francisco L; [REDACTED]
Subject: Sikorski in Brussels

b6
b7C

Jake and Huma -- Apparently we have some real drama going on with the Poles feeling snubbed at "losing" their bilat in DC this week. The late addition of a pull-aside tomorrow has not apparently fixed the problem, and the Poles still want a bilat on the margins of NATO. While we won't be able to confirm a time in Brussels until we get there, can I confirm to Steve Mull that we will in fact given Sikorski a meeting there? Sorry to add to the spam on this question, Julieta

PS -- Again, happy birthday Jake!

-----Original Message-----

From: Mull, Stephen D
Sent: Wednesday, November 28, 2012 5:10 PM
To: Noyes, Julieta Valls; Greene, Douglas C
Subject: RE: Today

b6
b7C

Thanks Julieta, but what started this whole drama was [REDACTED] message on Monday that the bilat the Secretary was supposed to have with Sikorski this Friday in Washington would no longer fit in the schedule and that we should instead offer a bilat in Brussels (attached). That prompted a wave of Sikorski angst aimed at least getting a brief Washington encounter to avoid the embarrassment of not getting even a brief encounter during the Washington stop (also attached). If getting that pull aside means scrubbing the fuller bilat in Brussels, we'll be in even a worse position -- is that what S staff is pushing?

Many thanks for your patience on this!

Steve

-----Original Message-----

From: Noyes, Julieta Valls

Sent: Wednesday, November 28, 2012 10:59 PM
To: Mull, Stephen D; Greene, Douglas C
Subject: RE: Today

Steve -- To clarify, what is confirmed is a pullaside tomorrow in DC, not a bilat in Brussels. My message may have been unclear. Thanks, Julieta

-----Original Message-----

From: Mull, Stephen D
Sent: Wednesday, November 28, 2012 4:53 PM
To: Noyes, Julieta Valls; Greene, Douglas C
Subject: RE: Today

Thanks Julieta; EUR will be in touch for details.

-----Original Message-----

From: Noyes, Julieta Valls
Sent: Wednesday, November 28, 2012 7:32 PM
To: Mull, Stephen D; Greene, Douglas C
Subject: RE: Today

b6
b7C

Per [redacted] yes, you can tell the Poles. Thanks. Julieta

-----Original Message-----

From: Mull, Stephen D
Sent: Wednesday, November 28, 2012 1:41 AM
To: Greene, Douglas C; Noyes, Julieta Valls
Subject: Re: Today

b6
b7C

Adding my former partner in crime Julieta Noyes, who's doing the trip and whom [redacted] asked to add Sikorski to schedule in Brussels. Julieta, anything new on you end?

Thanks,
Steve

----- Original Message -----

From: Greene, Douglas C
To: Mull, Stephen D
Sent: Wed Nov 28 06:56:43 2012
Subject: Re: Today

Thanks, Steve! I'll update you if I hear anything. In postponing the meeting, did we commit to a definite time and place for the future? It seems to me that commitment would be the best thing, short of a pull-aside. Doug

----- Original Message -----

From: Mull, Stephen D
To: Greene, Douglas C
Sent: Wed Nov 28 06:52:29 2012
Subject: Today

Hi Doug,

You'll see that this week's big crisis is sudden decision by S to put off mtg with Sikorski to next week in Brussels. Winid called it a "catastrophe" and Schnepf is beside himself. I told them both this is just moving venue and day by a few; they

feel embarrassed and are pressing for at least a pull-aside at tomorrow's award event. I'm disinclined to push for that since I think we have zero chance of getting both, but EUR was silent on it as of last night. If you hear anything on it let me know; you'll see I've written already to them for an update.

Otherwise I don't think you'll find any other messes to clean up.

Welcome back!

Steve

Mull, Stephen D

From: Mull, Stephen D
Sent: Thursday, November 29, 2012 12:17 AM
To: Abedin, Huma
Subject: Re: Sikorski in Brussels

Thanks Huma!

----- Original Message -----

From: Abedin, Huma
To: Noyes, Julieta Valls; Sullivan, Jacob J; 'huma@clintonemail.com' <huma@clintonemail.com>; Mull, Stephen D; Gordon, Philip H
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Welcome back!

Steve

Mull, Stephen D

From: Mull, Stephen D
Sent: Saturday, December 01, 2012 7:24 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: EUR TRIP UPDATES

b6
b7C

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
SMARTCategory: Working

Thanks [REDACTED]

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, December 01, 2012 1:34 AM
To: Mull, Stephen D; Greene, Douglas C; Hartley, Brent R; [REDACTED]
Subject: Fw: EUR TRIP UPDATES

b6
b7C

Fyi - see Poland ref.

From: Noyes, Julieta Valls
Sent: Friday, November 30, 2012 07:29 PM
To: Noyes, Julieta Valls; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>; Abedin, Huma; Hanley, Monica R; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Mushingi, Tulinabo S; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Doherty, Kathleen A; Hartley, Brent R; [REDACTED]
Pennington, Joseph S; [REDACTED]
Cc: Palmieri, Francisco L
Subject: EUR TRIP UPDATES

b6
b7C

Colleagues:


Thanks to your hard work and efficiency, we will not require a trip call on Saturday. Sorry if that disappoints you! I had promised replies to our pending questions after today's truncated trip call, so here they are:

- **NATO Bilats:** We are reaching out to the Russians, Poles, and Turks with specific times for bilats in Brussels (or Dublin if necessary). Others TBD.
- **Balkans Meeting on Margins of NATO:** Still awaiting word on this. If/when it happens and the Secretary participates it would be only for a 15-minute drop-by at the top, prior to her other events on Dec. 5 in Brussels.
- **Energy Agreement Signing:** This is cancelled. US-EU energy meeting is still on.
- **Pull Aside with EU Parliament President:** Approved on margins of EU reception in Brussels.
- **CONCERN Award Presentation:** Approved. Will happen on stage after the human rights speech in Dublin.
- **Pull Aside with NI State Secretary Theresa Villiers:** Approved, on margins of IAF lunch in Belfast.
- **Photo Ops in Belfast:** These (with peace makers and families of disappeared) will proceed as discussed, with possible addition of a few others.

The latest schedule is attached. Absent any major changes, this will be the final pre-departure schedule. Further updates will come from the road. If you need assistance or additional information, please email me or feel free to contact me through the Ops Center.

Again, sincere thanks from everyone on the Secretary's team for your hard work on this schedule, briefing materials, and advance preparations. It will be a great trip!

Julieta Valls Noyes
Deputy Executive Secretary
U.S. Department of State



b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 1
Page 35 ~ b6 - per DOS;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted] -302

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WF

Serial # of Originating Document

63

Date Received

3/2/2016

From

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

SA [Redacted]

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

MIDYEAR EXAM;

MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☐

Original notes re interview of

Interview Notes and documents displayed during interviews.

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

HRC-1576

3/2/2016 - Justin Cooper

b6
b7C

Remembers 2008 MacBook air purchase

- doesn't think HRC used it
- intent was to use computer in addition to BB
- assumes they likely set up to access email
- does not recall backup drive

1

[redacted] to accounts, had credit cards

b6
b7C

- JC, HA [redacted] later met would help set up tech.

b6
b7C

NY, DC Infrastructure

2

- Aware of SCIF ^{in both houses} coord. w/ state team w/ questions on non SCIF ~~rooms~~ infra.

b7E per DOS

- Whitehaven [redacted] SCIF - HRC had access, HA frequently there. Secure ^{also} phone/fax/video (both residences)

- Doesn't know who would rec. faxes

- Believes [redacted] may have clearance from military

b6
b7C

- Open door - not always secured, sometimes when HRC not @ residence was not closed. (both res.)

- JC did not have password/combo if closed.

- Safes in SCIF

- No understanding of when open/closed

- Have computers in ~~same~~ SCIF, no secure computers

- Non secure fax (both res.)

Apple Business Services came in & set up.

- had email client to run server
- handful of users
- didn't keep up w/ technology - blackberry email flow issues
- Phone calls w/ Apple, then sent specs.
- Apple setup equip. JC not sure he was there day of set up
- w/ office - JC + Apple assisted w/ setup. Apple had no ongoing access.
- Doesn't recall how paid, but likely by CC
- HRC came up with/approved HDR22 email
- JC believes it was on Apple server, but not sure
- Doesn't believe HA was on Apple
- No external backup, but had internal RAID drive
- Located in basement, workstation would use after deam.
- Family & staff only ones w/ physical access
- JC only one w/ admin, later BP to transfer

3 - Setup server due to need of segregation between different aspects of WJC post-presidency activity

- don't want politics mixed w/ foundations

—

- cancer was he might be able to gain phys.
- concern: if outside vendor got hacked, they might not tell/report
- hack never confirmed

4 - Devices used

- HRC would have forcing event to get new one
 - trackpad/roller ball failed
 - cracked screen
 - maybe weight
- Someone in proximity to HRC would go get new one
- Backup, load as much as possible from previous device
 - sometimes coached others
 - would try to break in half or hit w/hammer (dd)
 - Activate on server
 - 2 backups provided by JC were likely two times he ~~helps~~ assisted w/ trans.
 - M.H sometimes helped [redacted] might have purchased one
 - Doesn't recall procuring old models on ebay or similar

b6
b7C

5 - SIM card swapping

- does not recall a process where they would regularly switch

6 - JC blackberry - doesn't recall

7 - Security features

- More complex passwords - RIM always providing new tools to increase security
- New device pick up new policy
- older users might be on old policy

8 - iPads

- later attempts to get HRC to use new device
- [] an advocate of iPad for HRC
- Vague memory of having mini
- JC doesn't recall setting up any iPads
- Recalls iPad locking out server ^{root} because it had old password on it
- Recalls at least one iPad having cellular service
- No memory of apple IDs, iCloud
- Not involved in setting up device pwd (doesn't recall)

b6
b7C

9 - Confirmed []

b6
b7C

11 - Other phone

- Recog. #, usually had flip phone to accompany BB.
- Does not recog. phones.
- Liked it bec. comfortable to talk on.
- Also could be on BB at same time as phone

Apple to
BP server

- BP exported data/files
- Never created any archives of clintonemail.com

- Gmail - not gmail addresses, redirected servers to google (offered hosting services). Would redirect servers devices to check google.

- Assumes JC [] on google, not sure about HA & HRC.

b6
b7C

- Team effort - JC was on road during Sandy HRC-1580 to setup

12 - Spring 2013

- Doesn't recall providing laptop to MH
- Recalls HRC email address exposed because of SB Hack
- Could have retrieved laptop from President's office
- Conceivable JC could have helped transfer email, but doesn't recall
- No memory of USB drive
- No memory of return of laptop, but out of that role by early 2014 (became consultant Fall 2013)

- Minimal interaction w/ PRN

- spoke w/ [] to pass along passwords
- No other interactions
- email address removed b/c became purely a consultant.

b6
b7C

- No knowledge of FOIA production or culling.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-28-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

HRC-1582

Re: Laptop

From: Justin G. Coope [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

To: Hillary Clinton hr15@att.blackberry.net

CC: [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

Subject: Re: Laptop

Apple air.

-----Original Message-----

From: Hillary Clinton

To: Justin Cooper

ReplyTo: Hillary Clinton

Subject: Laptop

Sent: Nov 21, 2008 4:41 PM

What is the simplest to use and lightest to carry laptop?

Re: Laptop

To:

b6 per DOS

Subject:

Re: Laptop

How much does one cost?

HRC-1584

Re:

From: Justin G. Cooper [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

To: Hillary Clinton hr15@att.blackberry.net

CC: [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

Subject: Re:

Yes....but early since we leave for canada. Let me look at our schedules and figure out what time might make sense. Are you here all week?

-----Original Message-----

From: Hillary Clinton

To: Justin G. Cooper

ReplyTo: Hillary Clinton

Subject: Re:

Sent: Nov 22, 2008 4:39 PM

Are you going to be out here this week?

-----Original Message-----

From: Justin G. Cooper

To: Hillary Clinton

ReplyTo: [REDACTED]

Sent: Nov 22, 2008 3:34 PM

Subject:

b6 Per DOS

Just picked up your new laptop, backup drive, programs, and a protective sleeve. Got it for \$1950 total.

HRC-1585

Laptop

To: Justin Cooper [redacted] Huma Abedin
Huma_Abedin@clinton.senate.gov

b6 per DOS

Subject: Laptop

I need to get email set up on laptop so I can use. And I need to learn how to use it. Can you both help me get this done? Thx.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-28-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

2

HRC-1587

rom: H <hdr22@clintonemail.com>
ent: 3/29/2009 5:11:40 PM +00:00
o: Justin Cooper [redacted]
C: Huma Abedin
ub: Do not call lists

b6 per DOS

When the State Dept installed our phones, they did not put our numbers--in NY and DC--on the do not call lists so we've been getting calls about mattresses, life insurance, car financing, etc. Can you fix that for us?

Message Headers:

b6 per DOS

[Redacted message body]

To: "Justin Cooper" [redacted]
Cc: "Huma Abedin" <HABedin@hillaryclinton.com>
Subject: Do not call lists
From: "H" <hdr22@clintonemail.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2009 17:11:40 +0000

b6 per DOS

[Redacted message body]

R_F...AGER_TX_FLAG: true
R_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: -500360706
R_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -3
R_RIM_DELETED_BY_DE true
ICE:
R RIM MSG ON DEVICE true

HRC-1588
Dato

From:

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Sent: 3/17/2011 8:24:02 AM +00:00

To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

Subject: Fw: Fwd: School

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per FBI

[REDACTED]

From:

[REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 04:23 AM

To: Huma Abedin; Justin Cooper;

[REDACTED]

Subject: Fw: Fwd: School

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per FBI

From:

[REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 04:00 AM

To: [REDACTED] Huma (Clinton) Abedin <adebinh@state.gov>

Subject: Fw: Fwd: School

b6
b7C

HRC-1590

Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T

From: [REDACTED]
Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2011 09:58:45 -0700
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Fwd: School

b6
b7C

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [REDACTED]
Date: Wed, Mar 16, 2011 at 9:17 AM
Subject: Re: School
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED] Justin Cooper
[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per FBI

[REDACTED]

Best,

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

----- Original Message -----

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: School
Sent: Nov 2, 2010 4:23 PM

Hey [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per FBI

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Hope all is well,

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6: true

PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE: true

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: 1149022532

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: false

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -5

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID: [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

L Q -S-Exchange-Organization-SCL: -1

X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:

[REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

MIME-Version: 1.0

L U <w: Call from [REDACTED] L <E% LWO[A LWO[Axy HZ Fw%3A Call from
[REDACTED] EML%xxO|è L;fzObE yyy-

b6
b7C

1q [REDACTED],m*****a>e*****+ *****T|èTObE *****?ø,ø•E
•„yù[REDACTED] L <E% LWO[L Ld;“ | HÅ→ QÀ vÀ- CE€ "€\$ œ€4 €€[REDACTED]„[REDACTED]•[REDACTED]—

1ò€\$[REDACTED]÷€[REDACTED] ü L Re: Call from [REDACTED] L <E% LWO[L LWO[Lx÷ UZ Re%3A Call from
[REDACTED] 3.EMLèÄ±zè L|èTObE L5)§ n.blackbP TŽL [REDACTED] z Žv 8Šž žŠ ž†V [REDACTED]...b X„N

b6
b7C

f° Z P

€v [REDACTED] •[REDACTED]

%ç=•2ç

oIE•|Ž

Á•%-i•

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per FBI

[REDACTED]

He will never go away. We have largely avoided anything to do with him and don't get baited to engage but he's famous for [REDACTED]

He doesn't speak to [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] and desperately needs [REDACTED] to save face. He tried to engage with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] don't speak either.

----- Original Message -----

From: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 11:27 AM

To: Huma Abedin [REDACTED] Justin Cooper; [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Subject: RE: School

HRC-1593

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per FBI



From: Huma Abedin


Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 5:34 AM

b6
b7C

To: [redacted] Justin Cooper; [redacted]

Subject: Re: School

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per FBI



From: [redacted]

b6
b7C

Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 04:38 AM

To: [redacted] Huma Abedin; Justin Cooper; [redacted]


b6
b7C

Subject: Re: School



b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per FBI

HRC-1594



H¹;¹/₄t' □...²□aay□%o

90:°AOEÿ÷fgç{'¼{dTegŠ(?<+~□"Times New Roman".">

Oversight of financial markets and institutions to ensure transparency and honest dealing, competition, and consumer choice and to limit leverage to avoid future collapses and bailouts.</p>

<p class="x_MsoNormal" style="text-autospace:none"> </p>

<p class="x_MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in; text-autospace:none">Â

Protection and advancement of public interests the market canâ€™t fix, including clean air, clean water, safe food, safe transportation, safe workplaces, civil rights, access to affordable health







care, and preservation of natural resources for the common good, including national parks, national monuments, and national forests.</p>

<p class="x_MsoNormal" style="text-autospace:none"> </p>

<p class="x_MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in; text-autospace:none">Â

4

b6
b7c

212			
Picture	Device Make/Model	Earliest Date	Latest Date
	Blackberry Curve 8310	Jan-09	May-09
	Blackberry Curve 8900 Blackberry Curve 8900 Blackberry Curve 8900 Blackberry Curve 8900	Jun-09 Sep-09 Aug-11 Feb-12	Sep-09 Aug-11 Feb-12
	Blackberry Bold 9900	Feb-12	
	Blackberry Curve 8900	Feb-12	Mar-12
	Blackberry Curve 9360 Blackberry Curve 9360	Feb-12 Mar-13	Mar-13 Oct-13
	Blackberry Bold 9900	Oct-13	Nov-15

HRC-1597

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-28-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

----- Original Message -----

From: Bryan Pagliano [REDACTED]
To: Justin Cooper
Sent: Wed Apr 15 17:38:25 2009
Subject: RE: Won't get to huma today

b6 per DOS

Here foh is not working? That makes it easier actually.
I can migrate her contacts, forward her new mail and then we can just activate her without worrying about a transition day.

-Bryan

BTW - I have a bunch of sims here that I'll end up throwing away, you want me to mail them to you? Never hurts to have some on hand.

-----Original Message-----

From: Justin Cooper [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2009 5:34 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Won't get to huma today

b6 per DOS

They go away
We don't have a sim yet
Her foh isn't working so take ur time

----- Original Message -----

From: Bryan Pagliano [REDACTED]
To: Justin Cooper
Sent: Wed Apr 15 17:34:10 2009
Subject: Won't get to huma today

b6 per DOS

Tomorrow okay?

L uv n Cooper
Subject:

Hi Huma,

Im activating a new # and sim card for you with ATT and activating HRC's sim card as well.
Once your new # is set up you will need to send someone to an ATT store to pick up your new sim card and give them the imei # on your blackberry.
In the meantime do you have the sim card for HRC that Justin gave you? Can you tell me the sim # on it?

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

L y Ø

ent-ip=64.18.0.180; helo=exprod5og105.obsmtip.com; 15 Apr 2009 21:34:12.0791 (UTC)

FILETIME=[EB48D470:01C9BE11] "óóú ýýýý~!tp \$Fp"É ****JAD L

Ól~œ~læm%Å»=ü e•Ô L H@Û •◀ '!! æ± "T → °@& .t .# ¼^ Å! Å\$ È" Ì Øµ Ô% Ü% à Ly

b6
b7C

HRC-1599

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-28-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

6

From: Justin Coopes [REDACTED]
Sent: 5/30/2009 2:03:34 AM +00:00
To: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>
Subject:

b6 per DOS

Taking off soon.

They didnt get me a new berry here in time. So I can give her my old one so she's functional for ur trip.

7

Re: R.I.P.

From: Justin Coope [REDACTED]
To: Hillary Clinton HDR22@clintonemail.com
Subject: Re: R.I.P.

b6 per DOS

Berry service was down earlier so that my have been the issue.
Can still get you a new berry but probably not before you leave tomorrow.
Do you want to try the newer kind with the pad (huma has) instead of the ball ?

On switching the info -- your contacts and settings will all transfer as will a certain number of messages.

All of your older messages will remain on the server.




There is a way for me to move everything on to the new device but the security whizzes have convinced me that this is a horrible thing to do because you also transfer any viruses, spyware and junk overseas providers hide on there.

We also have some new security features and policies that I would like to add to any new berry you have -- the most noticeable difference will require a more complex password.

It is a constant fight to keep up with the security measures and unfortunately we keep seeing reminders of why we need to.

On Jun 6, 2011, at 11:56 AM, H wrote:

> I think my BB is finally in its last stage of life. I need a new one but don't want to lose any of my info. I leave tomorrow for Africa. Any chance I can get one by then? If not, don't worry.

iPad			
Picture	Device Make/Model	Earliest Date	Latest Date
	iPad Generation 1	Jun-10	Jan-15
	iPad Generation 3	May-12	
	iPad Mini		Dec-14

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-28-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

9

From: Justin Cooper [REDACTED] b6 per DOS, FBI
Sent: 7/26/2010 2:13:30 PM +00:00 b7C per DOS, FBI
To: [REDACTED] <SBUSTATE/NCC AG/RECIPIENTS [REDACTED]>
CC: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>
Subject: Re: CC for hPad

Zip is wrong. 10514
Prob my typo

----- Original Message -----

From: [REDACTED]
To: Justin Cooper
Cc: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Mon Jul 26 09:57:15 2010
Subject: CC for hPad

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Something here is being rejected - do I have it wrong?

Justin Cooper

[REDACTED]

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS



Justin Cooper

[REDACTED]
Chappaqua NY 10154

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-28-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

HRC-1610

b6
b7C

212			
Picture	Device Make/Model	Earliest Date	Latest Date
	Sony Xperia C6603	Apr-13	
	Motorola EX431G	Sep-13	Feb-14

12

From: [redacted]@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 7:16 PM
Subject: Re: HRC emails
To: [redacted]

b6
b7C

That's perfect

On Apr 9, 2014, at 6:46 PM [redacted] wrote:

b6
b7C

Sure thing. Earlier in the day is better- can we shoot for around 10am?

From: [redacted]mailto:[redacted]@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 09, 2014 6:38 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Re: HRC emails

b6
b7C

Apologies - is there a good time for you to go through this on Friday? Thanks! [redacted]

b6
b7C

On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 12:36 PM, [redacted]@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi [redacted] good to hear you're on the mend! I will try you a little later this afternoon. Best [redacted]

b6
b7C

On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 10:00 AM [redacted] wrote:
Hi [redacted] Sorry for the delay, I got extremely ill over the weekend and am just now feeling semi-human again.

b6
b7C

If you have some time today, can you call me so I can give you the details on how to access HRC's archived emails?

From: [redacted]@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, April 05, 2014 1:55 PM
To: Monica Hanley
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Re: HRC emails

b6
b7C

makes sense! would love the details - thanks!

On Sat, Apr 5, 2014 at 11:54 AM, Monica Hanley [redacted] wrote:
hi!

b6
b7C

I know I don't work with you anymore so no need to reply to me but if HRC wants access to her email, can she now access it through the web? [redacted] I think you should update Huma and [redacted] on where all of her old email is.

On Fri, Apr 4, 2014 at 10:11 AM [REDACTED] wrote:
Sorry, missed this the first time around. Yes, the email has been imported into an archive mailbox on the server, and I can send the mac back to you soon

b6
b7C

From: [REDACTED]@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, April 04, 2014 10:10 AM
To: Monica Hanley
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: HRC emails

Just checking back on this [REDACTED] is it still with you? Thank you [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 4:42 PM, [REDACTED]@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi guys - just following up on this. Let me know when the wiped laptop is ready to be shipped. [REDACTED] best to send it to the foundation at:

Hillary Rodham Clinton
c/o [REDACTED]
1271 Avenue of the Americas
42nd Floor
New York, NY 10020

b6
b7C

Let me know once it's gone out so we know to expect it. Thanks. [REDACTED]

On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 9:03 PM, Monica Hanley [REDACTED] wrote:
sounds great
if tomorrow falls through for you, we can find another time. Will email you in the morning.

b6
b7C

On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 9:02 PM [REDACTED] wrote:
Hi Monica-

I should be able to work with you on this tomorrow morning, can we shoot for around 11a EST?

From: Monica Hanley [mailto:[REDACTED]]
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2014 8:55 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: HRC emails

b6
b7C

Hi [REDACTED]
I am no longer with HRC's office (Jan 31st was my last day) but I wanted to try to finish the HRC email project which requires sending all of her archived email to your server. You recall that we couldn't figure out a way for you to connect to the laptop that I have in my possession.

Do you have time to try tomorrow? Last time, I tried from HRC's home but tomorrow I can try from my home, which has good wifi.

I'm adding [redacted] for her situational awareness [redacted] as soon we've transferred the email, I'll figure out a way to get the wiped laptop to you.

b6
b7c

best,
Monica

[redacted]

This email has been scanned for email related threats and delivered safely by Mimecast.
For more information please visit <http://www.mimecast.com>

This email has been scanned for email related threats and delivered safely by Mimecast.
For more information please visit <http://www.mimecast.com>

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For more information please visit <http://www.mimecast.com>

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 26

Page 28 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 29 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 30 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 31 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 32 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 33 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 34 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 35 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 36 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 37 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 38 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 39 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 40 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 41 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 42 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 43 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 64 ~ b5 - per DOS; b6 - per DOS;
Page 85 ~ Duplicate;
Page 93 ~ Duplicate;
Page 94 ~ Duplicate;
Page 95 ~ Duplicate;
Page 96 ~ Duplicate;
Page 97 ~ Duplicate;
Page 98 ~ Duplicate;
Page 101 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 106 ~ b5 - per DOS;

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

#57

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

-302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WFO

Serial # of Originating Document

67

Date Received

APRIL 5, 2016

From

HUMA ABEDIN

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

1A57

WFO YEAR EXAM

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☒ Original notes re interview of

- INTERVIEW NOTES

- NDA

- PDF Docs/EMAILS

HRC-1616

4/5/16 HOMA ABEDINI

Miguel Rodriguez (Bryan Cant)

KARL DUNN (BACS, SCHULZ & FLEWELL)

[REDACTED]

"

"

"

b6

b7C

- started in 96 intern in office of 1st LAD/
Senate Campaign, pros campaign to DOS
then TENURE, joined in PRIVATE sector
pro

TRAVELING COS HILLARY for pros 2008

DCOS for ops office of Sec.

- Cheryl Mills
- Jake Sullivan (co-Deputy)
- Exec Asst (Joe McManus)
- Spec Asst (3x)
- Scheduler
- Personal Assistant

- Dos 1st time w/ a clearance with a CAUS on Board
in person BRIEF AND PAPER WORK

- explain DIFF levels and HANDLING of DOCS

- TS doesn't believe she was read into any
SAP, compartments

- Doesn't recall Fed Rec train, but there
were a lot of trainings

- Not a COCA

Connie

Office in SCIF

Internet Access

Desk top → UNCLASS @ STATE.GOV

b7E per DOS

→ Highside

- OPERLINE phone then yellow [] TS phone

→ USED TO TALK TO NSC

→ NO FORMAL GUIDANCE STATE.GOV FOR DOS WORK

- DIDN'T USE Highside VERY OFTEN DIDN'T

KNOW IF IT WAS S OR TS. DIDN'T KNOW WHAT 'JWICS' IS (^{weeks} DAYS w/o checking it)

- SUPPORT TO OTHERS → FORWARDED

- MORE DETAILED OPS ASSETS

- TRIP REPORTING FROM SOAS ASSETS

examples of H/L
of H/L
of H/L

Huma@

- ClintonEMAIL. Accessed AT STATE.

b6
b7C

- YAHOO []

(HAD FOR 10 YRS)

- NO EMAIL GOV.

[]

TO SUPPORT HUSBANDS.
→ CAMPAIGN ^{activity} ~~business~~

ClintonEMAIL

→ Clinton PERSONAL AFFAIRS TO COMMUNICATE w/ THEIR PERSONAL STAFFS, FRIENDS OF SC

→ USED IF STATE.GOV WAS DOWN

→ WOULD FIND TO PRINT FROM

Yahoo

- FORWARDING

- STATE NEWS CLIPS.

TAB1

couldn't see

WAS AWAY (BASED ON DATES)

- DOESN'T REMEMBER WHY SHE STARTED

TAB 2 - PAK MEMO

- DOC NOT FAMILIAR.
- NOT SURPRISED TO BE FORWARDING sent TO YAHOO TO PRINT TO THE SECRETARY.
- DIDN'T MAKE JUDGEMENT ON CLASSIFICATION RELIED ON SENDER. / DIDN'T READ IT.
- PRINT FROM CUNNINGHAM OR YAHOO, IF TRAVELING. COULDN'T ACCESS STATEGOV.

b6
b7CPrinting
center

in 2009

- worked for Holbrook in SRAP, now AMBASSADOR.

C.M. / J.S. / M.H. ALL HAD PERSONAL ACCOUNTS.

IF STATEGOV WAS DOWN → PERSONAL ACCOUNT.
OR NOT OFFICIAL BUSINESS?

MOST OF
WORK ON STATEGOV. WAS ALLOWED TO USE
PERSONAL ACCOUNTS. →

"IT WOULD ADVISE TO USE PERSONAL ACCOUNT
IF STATEGOV WAS DOWN"

- DOUGIL REMEMBER INTRUSION ATTEMPTS
RECALLS PEOPLE HAD ISSUE w/ EMAIL BUT
DID NOT HAVE EMAIL

b6
b7C

TAB 3

- ELISE VOLUNTEER INC WASTELANDS
"center"

DOUGIL RECALL / KNOW THAT IT WAS CON

HAD STATE FBS w/ STATE GOV EMAIL
BELIEVED ALL OF TEAM HAD FBS

Secure Cell -

- ISSUED AS THE TRAVELING phone for S.
- RARE THAT SHE WAS w/o secure Comm.
- DS OR AEST CARRIED. NOT ALWAYS PART OF PACKAGE [] (SP)

b6
b7C

- NOT SURE WHERE IT WAS KEPT
- SR STAFF HAD ACCESS TO OTHERS IF NEEDED

SCIF - CLEAR GUIDANCE ON DEVICES IN THE SCIF

TRAVEL BRIEFINGS FOR OVER SEAS TRIPS BY DS

b7E per DOS

[]

- PAT Kennedy's etc.

'TAKE BATTERIES out'

- Lew Lukins

- Joe McCl.

GENERAL SENSE OF SECURITY when TRAVELING.

→ TO Consider for security ds.

TAB 516

TYPICAL OF GUIDANCE GIVEN BY DS.

was FOLLOWED BY TEAM.

S - NOT present, PAT would be FORWARDED ON THE PLANE

- AT RUSSIA

complete to other

→ KEY FOR TO ACCESS GUN ACCOUNTS, Clinton, YAKO

→ SOME COUNTRIES - were given phones in country

- EGYPT - PMS MURRAYAN RESIDENCE - TOOK ALL OF THE TEAMS DEVICES - (DS would BE present)

- David Kater and OVERSEAS ISSUES w/ SMITH, ROOMS, ETC

⑤

Sec

- REGULAR PHONE (UNCLASS)
- WHITE PHONE (REMOVED)
- [] TS phone
- STE FOR A PERIOD.

b7E per DOS

- COMPUTERS → NONE IN OFFICE.

↳ MOST OF WORK ON PAPER OR IN PERSON. WOULD STOP OUT TO CHECK EMAILS.

- WHITE HAVEN (DC)

- COMPUTER, FAX

- DOS installed STE, yellow phone, VTC, FAX

- CHAD (NY)

- SAME BUT NO VTC

TRAVE Sec HAD A DOMESTIC → SECURE CELL

NEARBY
→ COMUS TEAM FOR CAUS/PAPER

COMUS → FULL INTERVIEW

PLANE VIDEO CONF, SEC/UNSEC UNOS

→ HOTEL

WHITE HAVEN

- SELF ON [] FLOOR, SMALL OFFICE.

b7E per DOS

CONVERTED BY DOS. 1/2 SIZE OF []

- DESK, CLOSET, COMPUTER, PRINTER, TV.

- TOOK DOOR OFF INSTALLED TEMP DOOR w/

META KEY CODE (NOT ALWAYS LOCKED).

CHAPPAQUA [] FLOOR

b7E per DOS

- TINY OFFICE - 1/4 SIZE SAME TEMP AS NY BUT NO TV.

ONLY PERSON IN THERE WAS S.

HRC-1621

cell coverage
not good
in NY.
→ HAVEN
ALSO
NOT SIDE

6

b7E per DOS

more often

- USED [REDACTED] PHONE, DOESN'T RECALL USING STE USER often.

b6
b7C

- MONICA, H.A. HASE MANAGER
(HAD ACCESS TO SUE)

[REDACTED]

NY
R

TECHNICAL CHALLENGES w/ THE SECURE FAX.

TAB 6

- DOESN'T RECALL THE EMAIL OR CONTEXT

- WOULD BE TOLD IF IT NEEDED TO BE SECURE (IN GENERAL)

- WAS LIKELY w/ HSR, WOULD BE UNUSUAL FOR HA TO READ CONTEXT AND MAKE JUDGMENT.

→ OR TO ANSWER SEC REQUEST.

ON THE CONTEXT → LIKELY CONSULTED w/ SOURCE or ON THE DECISION IF SEC or NO SEC.

→ RELIED ON SENDER

→ NOT EXPERTISE OR RESPONSIBILITY

- [REDACTED] (ASSISTANT IN THE OFFICE)

b6
b7C

- SEC WOULD USUALLY SAY IF SECURE OR NOT

TYPICAL SECURE WITHIN w/ NYC OFFICE WITH.

- IN DOS MOST BUSINESS IN PERSON.

- TRAVELING - BASED ON PARTY'S REQUEST.

"NEED SEC w/ THE SECRETARY"

BLACK

11:11
11:20 AM

Secure Cell/BB (Pg 4 of 6)

- IN BLACK BOX - LOOKED LIKE AN OUTSIDE PHONE

HAD TO ATTACH BATTERY TO USE

- DIDN'T USE USER often ^{on cut off or hard}

- MOBILE COMMUS TEAM ^{WAS DEFAULT} IF GOING TO Long Island/Dorham

- NO SECURE BB. NOT AVAILABLE TO HSR. Knowledge

- SEC DIDN'T GET A DOS BB. WAS PERSONAL

HRC-1622

⑦

TAB 7 - MULL EMAIL RE DOS BB.

- RECALLS EXCHANGE ARRIVED w/ OWN BB. WANTED ONLY 1 DEVICE.
- WAS IN HAMPTONS (IRENE) AND HAVING COMM. ISSUES.
- WOULDN'T MAKE SENSE FOR LOGISTICS REASONS. TRANSFER CONTACTS TO NEW DEVICE ONLY TO TRANSFER CONTACTS/EMAILS BACK ~~W/~~ ONCE HER SYSTEM WAS UP.
- NOT SURE WHAT "MASK IDENTITY" REFERS TO

→ ADDITIONAL CONTEXT

- W/PGI CONTACT

- IS PROBABLY SILLY AND SHE KNOWS IT.

F: 2015-12685
CG5405671

b6
b7c

TAB 8 - BREWELL MEMO

- HAS SEEN MEMO AND NEWS ON THIS
- DOESN'T RECALL IT OCCURRING. WOULD BE RELEVANT TO HER B/C NOT HAVING A BB DIDN'T AFFECT HER ABILITY TO DO THE JOB.
- POSSIBLE THAT DS GAVE BRIEF ON BB VULNERABILITY. DOESN'T RECALL SPECIFICALLY BUT THEY FREED GOT FORCES.
- BB ~~WAS~~ /IPAD WAS PRIMARY WAY FOR SEC TO CHECK EMAILS. COULDN'T / DIDN'T KNOW HOW TO USE A COMPUTER.
- WHO HAD ACCESS
 - SR TEAM AT DOS, W/ MEETINGS DAILY.
 - MOSTLY IN PERSON OR ON THE PHONE.
- SR OFFICIALS GIVEN EMAIL ADDRESS IF THEY ASKED FOR IT. BY HA, OR SEC WOULD INITIATE CONTACT.

HRC-1623

(8)

(Primary Assistant)

b6
b7C

HA, JS, CM, M. NOT FILTERS, HAD KNOWLEDGE
OF MATERIAL AND WOULD
SHAPE W HER

TAB 9

CONTACTED
Pres - VIA [REDACTED] WOULD CALL ONZ
OFFICE.

b6
b7C

- HAD Pres ADDRESS BUT DIDN'T KNOW

- WHO IS JOHN BURKE? "HOW IS THIS
NOT CLASSIFIED"

- COULD ONLY RELIEVE FROM APPROVED
EMAIL ADDRESSES

- NOT SURE HOW OFTEN THEY EMAILED

(DEVICES TO IN COUNTRY, VARIED BY TRIP)

WOULD HAVE SENT VIA BB, HA NOT ON TRIP

TRANSITION TO DOS

ENGAGED W/ DOS A FEW MONTHS PRIOR.

SEC LUNCH W/ SEC RICE, HA MET W/ HER
TEAM.

- PAT KENNEDY WAS MAIN POC FOR TRANSITION
→ TRANSITION OFFICE SETUP.

WORKED W/ PAT & CLERY ON SLOTS FOR S. STAFF

- ID, INTERVIEW - Pres Asst / Scheduler / ^{PERSONAL} ~~COOPERATED~~

[REDACTED] Joe, Low Lukens

b6
b7C

→ Implementation disc 2nd meeting.

SEC RICE HAD COMPUTER, HC DIDN'T WANT IT

- DIDN'T REALIZE DISC RE SERVER

→ HA NOT AWARE OF SERVER

→ EMAIL WAS A CONTINUATION OF PRIOR HRC-1624
ART. BACKBERRY.NET → ADDED HE/SEC TO NEWS

HA - WAS LOSING TWO EMAIL ACCOUNTS.

(9)

EMAIL WHEN B.C. WAS TRANS EMAILS

EMAILS.

Pres Clinton tech ROC

Justin Cooper

Att. BTB ✓

setting up

mycingular - not FAM

@Clinton email.

hdr 22

can add you

hdr 17.

hdr 29 - correct



- NOT FAMILAR. w/ H.

b6

b7C

- Don't remember could s re: related references
HA WAS GIVEN STRATEGY AND USED IT.

- HC DIDN'T WANT MULTIPLE DEVICES WAS TOLD
THAT YOU COULDN'T HAVE PERS EMAIL ON
STATE DEVICE.

TO COM
W/ FRIENDS
FAMILY
W/ AGENT
OF DOS
WAS TOLD
IN PERSON
ON
PHONE
EMAIL NOT
DISCUSS
THE PRIMARY
FORM OF
EXCHANGE

Don't recall
SR OFFICIALS WERE AWARE, APPROVAL PROCESS
- WAS CLEAR THAT YOU USE DOS ACCOUNT PRIMARY
- BUT COULD USE OTHER EMAIL IF NEC.

- Don't recall ANY COULD S RE: STATE

- DISC TO EMAIL WERE ABOUT FIXING ISSUES, NOT
ABOUT NOT USING.

TAB 16A → DOESN'T KNOW SMSES@STATE EMAIL.

TAB 16B

SSHRC → TO OBVIOUS

→ HURRICANE IRIS DISC W/ MAIL ABOUT
EST COMM.

- DOESN'T KNOW John Bartel, maybe in IT.

- ASSUMED ALL WAS SUBJECT TO FOIA, DIDN'T
DISCUSS EXPLICITLY. DIDN'T THINK SOME ACCOUNTS
WEREN'T SUBJECT TO FOIA.

HRC-1625

- LEARNED OF SERVER 1.5 YRS AGO WHEN STORIES CAME OUT IN PRESS
- KNEW A FIRM WAS BROUGHT INTO MANAGE CHANGING ACCOUNTS
 - Justin Cooper - Longtime staffer ^{did everything for WK, IT matters}
 - Go to Person for tech
- Bryan Raynor Camp 2008, then DCS
- WHEN HE WAS IN SENATE, HA CALLED JC ABOUT GETTING A FB FOR HRC AND ABOUT FIXING THE ISSUES (E) EMAILS NOT WORKING
- 2008 CAMPAIGN - BP IT TEAM
 - JC → PAID RIVER NETWORKS TO MANAGE WLC & C.C. EMAILS
 - THEY DIDN'T DEAL W/ JC & BP REGARDING EMAILS AS MUCH
 - DON'T KNOW WHAT OTHERS KNEW.
 - DON'T RECALL PEOPLE RAISING CONCERNS RE: THE SERVER

TAB 17

RELATES PROBLEM

DON'T RECALL EXCHANGE NOT COMMON FOR JS TO BE INVOLVED IN EMAILS. (APPEARS MESSAGES NOT GETTING THROUGH) EMAILS FROM HC GOING INTO SPAM ON DCS SYSTEM

NEVER ~~WAS~~ HAD DISC W/ HE ABOUT USING DOS SYSTEMS, BUT ~~WAS~~ IN HANDSIGHT SHOULD HAVE USED DOS SYSTEMS.

(11)

HC HAD IPAD (2010) AFTER STORM GOT
EMAILS ON DEVICE (TEMPORARY FIX)
BUT CAPABILITY MAY HAVE REMAINED
THERE AFTER.

[REDACTED]

current

" 212

[REDACTED]

(current #)

b6
b7C

(2)

" 202

(doesn't recall seems odd

NEVER HAD A DC BLESS EMAIL)

PHONES CONNECTED BY WHO EVER WAS AROUND

- MOLICA - HAS BB, NEW EMAIL AFTER HACK

[REDACTED]

↳ WOULD BUY ONE BUT

HE WOULDN'T LIKE IT

WOULD GO BACK TO OLD
ONE / MODE.

b6
b7C

- DOESN'T KNOW HOW OLD ONES WERE HANDLED

TABLE

NOT SURE, BUT CONTACTS, PICS, ETC ON SIM
CARDS

↳ [REDACTED]

WAS

[REDACTED]

IN WJCOFFICE

b6
b7C

MAYBE UNDER VOSTAL.

IPADS - AT LEAST 4 IF NOT 2 ONE MIGHT HAVE BEEN
A GIFT.

- PAREN SAW HER USE - TO CONSUME NEWS

[REDACTED]

- TRANSFERRED ON ONE (ON PLANE)

b6
b7C

MAYBE J.C. OR 2ND

- DIDN'T CARRY VERY OFTEN.

- "HANDFUL OF TIMES SAW HER USE IT"

↳ BB OR PAPER INSTEAD

EMAIL, APPLE ID, CLOUD - DIDN'T KNOW

HRC-1627

← HURRICANE SANDY →

IRENE - HA OVER SEAS. MONICA WAS HANDLING.
IT WAS A DISASTER. BB DOWN.

Set IPAD TO GET EMAIL (LONG ISLAND)

HA - WAS IN NY W/ GMAH AND (FOCUS ON SSF)

SANDY - EMAIL DOWN FOR APPROX 2 WKS.

(Believe DCS BB DOWN ALSO)

- Don't know how it was resolved.

TAB 19

Doesn't recall DETAILS / SPECIFICS.

TAB 22-21

Doesn't recall CIRCUMSTANCES.

TRUSTED J.C. TO FIX THINGS. DON'T

RECALL TELLING SEC BUT THINKS THAT

SHE WOULD HAVE TOLD HER & COLLEAGUES.

TAB 22

DIDN'T RECALL (USED WRONG ADDRESS).

→ CHALLENGING RELATIONSHIP W/ [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

→ NO RECOLLECTION OF HACK INTO SERVER

PRN - [REDACTED] ✓ [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

- SEVERAL CONVERS W/.

- HOW TO USE COMPUTER SYSTEM (OUTLOOK) ^{NOW IN}
(PERSONAL OFFICE POST DCS)

- SET UP STAFF ACCOUNTS

o CLINTONEMARK "going away" / new email to
FORMALIZE NEW OFFICE

o LOST MOST OF CLINTONEMARKS.

o DIDN'T HAVE SYSTEM FOR ARCHIVING. (Desktop)

DON'T KNOW IF ADMIN DID BACKUP.

(THINKING)

REMEMBERED COME W/ HANUS / CREATING
AN ARCHIVE ON A LAPTOP OF HRC STAFFS

→ FOR WRITING BOOK

DIDN'T KNOW IT WENT TO PRN / OR LOCATION OF.

13

• DIDN'T KNOW OF A
• THUNDERDRIVE BACKUP OF EMAILS.

• STOP USED CLINTON EMAIL.COM
• POST DOS → HRCOFFICE.COM

MOVED TO NYC SET UP OFFICE FOR BOB &
STAFF WANT FORMAL EMAILS

• NYC [] WANTED TO GO TO PERM. HE WENT TO.
[] } GOOD W/ TEST STUFF b6
[] } INVOLVED W/ b7C
[] } DISC RE:
[] } TRANSITION!

• NOT AWARE OF ANYBODY DELETING OLD EMAILS
• HRCOFFICE - CLEAN SLATE CAN'T SEE CLINTON EMAILS
• NOT SURE ABOUT HC (IF MIGRATION OCCURRED)

• NOBODY ELSE AT DOS HAD CLINTONEMAIL.COM.
ADDRESSES. BESIDES HA/HRC.
HA BK LONGTIME AIDE HELPED W/ PERSONAL
MATTERS.

b6
b7C

• HRCOFFICE - EVERYBODY ON MANHATTAN TEAM

[] - TRIP DIRECTOR }
[] - } CORE
[] - } TEAM
[] - } FROM
[] - } DOS

USED GMAIL UNTIL HRCOFFICE
WAS ESTABLISHED. SETUP

BY [] (?)
- hrc@ymail.

[] - Monica
[] - H.A.

[]
[]

② EMAIL REVIEW

- READ ARTICLE IN PAPER MARCH 2005

- DOS REQUEST EMAILS (SOT TO WORKING ADDRESS)

- GAVE DEVICES TO ATTORNEY - LAPTOP, BB FOR REVIEW. Relied on Attorney, placed on side of caution.

- SOME CLONED EMAILS MAY HAVE BEEN RELEVANT. [Sought but didn't receive guidance from DOS] over 1 week

• SEPARATE REVIEW FROM PUGHARTY (MURDER)

• NOT INVOLVED IN HRC REVIEW. DONE BY HER ATTORNEYS (NEVER CONSULTED)

→ "DOS WANTED TO ENSURE COMPLETE RECORD OF DOCS FOR SEC TALKS

ACCESS ACCOUNTS VIA WEB BROWSER

"DIDN'T ASK FBI TO PULL RELEVANT RECORDS REQUEST. "IN POSSESSION OR CUSTODY"

TAB 23

WOULD NOT HAVE HAD ACCESS TO & COULD NOT PRODUCE BUT WOULD BE RESPONSIVE.

TAB 24

(UPCLASSIFIED BY DOS)

VAGAN / REMEMBERS THE EXCHANGE

SEC TO SPEAK W/ AC

- TALK THIS VERY IMPORTANTLY RE: CLASSIFIED INFO.

- RELIED ON THE SENDER'S MARKINGS, DIDN'T TAKE IT UPON SELF TO QUESTION MARKINGS AT THE JUDGMENT.

"JUST A CONVEYOR OF INFO TO THE SEC"

• NEVER HAD CONCERN W/ HOW IT WAS HANDLED
NEVER HAD DISC W/ HE WHERE SHE HAD CONCERNS.

(15)

- MET SVD IN WH IN APPROX 96
- SE WH OFFICIAL / SHE WAS A JR STAFFER
- WOULD FORWARD EMAILS FROM HIM (some days)
- BUT DIDN'T WORK w/ DIRECTLY.
- LOSS EMAILS FROM SVD AT STATE (info, let she didn't forward) HC → HA TO PRINT
- HA DIDN'T READ THEM
- NO KNOWLEDGE OF HIS SOURCE / METHODS.

- TALKING POINTS

- Press / SPEECH → SPEECH WRITERS
- CALL → ^{Approp.} ~~DOCS~~ BUREAU

NOT TALKING POINTS BUT DIDN'T DRAFT THEM.

DIP POUCHES → BRIEF / PAPERS FOR NEXT DAY

- IF IN OFFICE → PICKED UP ON WAY OUT
- HAND DELIVERED TO DS AGENT AT NY / DC PLACED ON BENCH

DC ~~Wanted~~ → BENCH BY [REDACTED]

NY → BENCH BY [REDACTED]

AGENT [REDACTED] → DS AGENT TO HOUSE

NY - DOESN'T KNOW IF [REDACTED] TRANSPORTED

DC - [REDACTED] LEFT BY 5 WOULDNT TAKE POUCH

Delivered
EVERY NIGHT
b7E per DOS
Deliv. sk. wave
TRAVEL w/ pouch

FAXES

DC - DIDN'T RECEIVE MANY DOCS TO
SEC FAX ISSUES EARLY ON, EASIER TO
DELIVER.

NY - DOCS SENT TO SEC FAX

[REDACTED] WOULD PICK UP / HANG UP FAX

didn't HANDLE MATERIAL / PAPER

- PICKED UP NON-SECURE FAXS (DIF. NRC 1031)

NO CENSURE

DO

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

KNOWS HE PICKED UP PHONE BUT DIDN'T
SPEND TIME IN SVF OTHER THAN CLEANING
ETC.

BREKFS IN POUCH

- FDS IN PERSON IN THE OFFICE
- CIA OFFICER AT HOUSE IN PERSON
- SCARE FR.

[TAB 14] - "KNOW FOR A FACT" THAT THERE
WERE INSTANCES

inlet/GOAL - HAVE SEC IDIT HERSELF BUT
SHE WASN'T TEST SAUF AND WOULD
GET FRUSTRATED

- CONFIDENT [] DIDN'T HANDLE
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

b6
b7C

- FWDs TO [] TO PRINT - PRESS CLIPS.
USUALLY FIRST STAGE TO ARRIVE.

b6
b7C

- NY - MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO PRINT, ASK [] TO

GET 2012
[TAB 30] - NOT COMMON SECURANCE

- COMMON TO STORE THE POUCH IN THE []
W/ DS OR SS
HKS [] LOS [] W/DS

b7E per DOS



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

I Miguel E. Rodriguez, certify that on this date,
April 5, 2016, I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified
information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce
this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of
classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United
States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to
comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the
property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined
by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter
employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to:
(1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a
violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or
of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower
protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by
controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are
controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and
obligations imposed upon me by this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.


Signature


Date of Birth

04/05/2016.
Date

b6
b7C

HRC-1633



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

I [redacted], certify that on this date, 4/5/16, I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

b6
b7C

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to: (1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.

Signature

Date of Birth

Date

b6
b7C

HRC-1634



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

I, Kaylen Diner, certify that on this date, April 5, 2016, I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.


I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this agreement.


I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to: (1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.


Signature


Date of Birth
4/5/16
Date

b6
b7C

Visitor
FD-426 (Rev. 7-12-95)

Date 4-5-2016

NAME OF DIVISION OR SECTION

ADMITTED

DEPARTED

Log Date	Name of Visitor (P) Print (S) Signature	Badge # and/or Title	Agency	Point of Contact/Signature/Ext./Purpose	Time	Initials	Time	Initials
4/5	P [Redacted] S [Redacted]	[Redacted]	FBI	[Redacted]	8:15	[Redacted]		
4/5	P [Redacted] S [Redacted]	[Redacted]	FBI	[Redacted]	9:23		2:12	
4/5	P [Redacted] S [Redacted]		DOJ	"	"		2:12	
4/5	P <u>DAVID H. LAUFMAN</u> S <u>[Signature]</u>	Temp # [Redacted]	DRT	"	9:30	DHL	1:55	
4/5	P <u>Karen Dunn</u> S <u>[Signature]</u>					KLD	2:10	
4/5	P <u>Huma Abedin</u> S <u>[Signature]</u>				10:05	HMA	2:10	
4/5	P <u>Miguel Rodriguez</u> S <u>[Signature]</u>				10:05	Lu.	2:10	
4/5	P [Redacted] S [Redacted]				10:05		2:10	
	P _____ S _____							
	P _____ S _____							
	P _____ S _____							
	P _____ S _____							
	P _____ S _____							

b6
b7C

HRC-1636

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-29-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

HRC-1637

From: huma abedin <huma@clintonemail.com>

Sent: 9/1/2011 12:52:29 AM +00:00

To: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>

Subject: Fwd: Calls

----- Forwarded message -----

From: Hanley, Monica R <HanleyMR@state.gov>

Date: Tue, Aug 30, 2011 at 3:56 PM


Subject: Calls

To: huma@clintonemail.com

- she confirmed the 5:50pm time for potus call and his office will call [REDACTED]
- she has not acknowledged the kissinger request. He is available after 4pm.

b6 per DOS

Message Headers:



b6 per DOS
b7E per DOS

HRC-1638

From: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>
Sent: 10/4/2009 11:06:39 PM +00:00
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Fw: U.S. interests in Pak Paper 10-04
Attachments: U.S. interests in Pak Paper 10-04.doc

b6 per DOS

From: [REDACTED]
To: Abedin, Huma
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Sun Oct 04 19:01:02 2009
Subject: FW: U.S. interests in Pak Paper 10-04

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Huma

Pls find attached the full, main Pakistan memo. Best [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS


PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: false
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -5
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: 512685951
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6: true
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE: true

HRC-1640

DRAFT 10-04

I. U.S. INTERESTS AND PAKISTAN

b5 per DOS



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-29-2016 BY J76J18T8D NSICG

3

HRC-1658

From: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>

Sent: 8/16/2010 4:06:53 PM +00:00

To: "Hanley, Monica R" <HanleyMR@state.gov>

Subject: Re: your [] acct

b6 per DOS

I went in and changed password

From: Hanley, Monica R
To: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Mon Aug 16 10:11:08 2010
Subject: RE: your [] acct

b6 per DOS

Yeah I wonder if someone hacked in. that stinks

From: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Monday, August 16, 2010 10:10 AM
To: Hanley, Monica R
Subject: RE: your [] acct

b6 per DOS

Weird

And my [] isn't working this morning

b6 per DOS

From: Hanley, Monica R
Sent: Monday, August 16, 2010 10:04 AM
To: Abedin, Huma
Subject: your [] acct

b6 per DOS

Geri just called – She got a spam email from your [] acct last night.

b6 per DOS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-29-2016 BY J76J18T8D NSICG

4

HRC-1660

From: "Macmanus, Joseph E" <CLASSSTATE/CBPC ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP/RECIPIENTS/MACMANUSJE>
Sent: 10/6/2009 6:07:49 PM +00:00
To: "Mills, Cheryl D" <MillsCD@state.sgov.gov>; "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.sgov.gov>; "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: IT security in Moscow

Our Mobile Communications Team sent in an email on electronic surveillance and monitoring in Russia, which I've excerpted below. The gist of it is: what's yours is theirs.

We will brief staff at the airport before departure, and post the necessary warnings in the hotel.

From: Mobile Communications Team, Moscow Advance
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2009 10:40 AM
Subject: IT security in Moscow

b7E per DOS

Yesterday at the RSO's security briefing, the RSO stated that the IT threat level here in Moscow currently

The following are recommendations regarding IT security in Moscow:

Strong recommendation against any classified material or conversations in the hotel, including STE conversations and any printed materials, whether brought to the hotel by the party or delivered by courier. No matter how well

[redacted] The b7E per DOS
Secretary's suite as well as the Senior Bureau, the Secretariat, and all bedrooms will be [redacted]

Strong recommendation against the use of BlackBerry: when you bring your BlackBerry online in Moscow [redacted]

b7E per DOS

Strong recommendation against computers connected to the Internet in the hotel [redacted]

b7E per DOS

Authorized the use of FOBs in the hotel ONLY for use with government-owned laptops under 100% continuous positive control by a cleared American. [redacted]

b7E per DOS

NOTE: a lost or stolen FOB here in Moscow is a major security threat. All b7E per DOS
must take great care not to loose their FOBs. [redacted]

DS Lead and DS Logistics indicated that they did not want computers and printers in their bedrooms per the IT requirements and would rather work in the Embassy. The laptops intended for them are being stored in the Embassy.

Communications set-up in Moscow:

Computers issued by MCT or supported by MCT (e.g., Abedin, Sullivan, Macmanus) [REDACTED]

b7E per DOS

[REDACTED] the Marines and DS will restrict access. Anyone in a bedroom outside of the [REDACTED] must keep their laptops in their possession at all times or store them at the Embassy (for example in a [REDACTED])

Computers we set up in S offices and bedrooms will be laptops owned by the Embassy and will remain in our custody while outside of the Embassy. The traveling party should be notified that we will have to use laptops instead of desktops at this stop.

STEs in the S suite: the Secretary should be briefed [REDACTED]

b7E per DOS

RSO recommends courier of documents to the hotel [REDACTED]

b7E per DOS

RSO permits use BlackBerries. AS SOON AS users return to Washington, their Blackberry will need to be cleaned [REDACTED]

b7E per DOS

[REDACTED]

Any government laptop used in the hotel and returned to Washington will
need to be [REDACTED]

b7E per DOS

The use of a personal computer is not recommended; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b7E per DOS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-29-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

5
HRC-1665

From: Justin Cooper [REDACTED]
Sent: 10/12/2009 2:50:51 PM +00:00
To: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>
Subject: Re: Communication

b6 per DOS

Awesome

----- Original Message -----

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
To: Justin Cooper
Sent: Mon Oct 12 10:50:26 2009
Subject: Re: Communication

Its for security reasons
I don't want to use that one either

----- Original Message -----

From: Justin Cooper [REDACTED]
To: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Mon Oct 12 10:49:56 2009
Subject: Re: Communication

b6 per DOS

Are they taking them from u. Bc ur clintonemail.com shld work

----- Original Message -----

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
To: Doug Band; Hannah Richert; Oscar Flores; Jon Davidson; Justin Cooper
Sent: Mon Oct 12 10:49:04 2009
Subject: Fw: Communication

Fyi for tues and wed.
We won't have berries in russia

----- Original Message -----

From: Abedin, Huma
To: Mills, Cheryl D; Valmoro, Lona J; Coleman, Claire L; Syed, Zia S; Beale, Courtney A Kramer; Macmanus, Joseph E; Dewan, Linda L; Crocker, Bathsheba N; Campbell, Piper; Wells, Alice G; Hanley, Monica R; Laszczych, Joanne; Toiv, Nora F; Smith, Daniel B; Jiloty, Lauren C; Muscatine, Lissa; Slaughter, Anne-Marie; Crowley, Philip J; Steinberg, James B; Lew, Jacob J; [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

Cc: Lukens, Lewis A; Hunter, Theresa M
Sent: Mon Oct 12 10:46:44 2009
Subject: Communication

Want to make sure DC is aware that those of us in the Russia traveling party will be leaving blackberries on the airplane once we touch down in moscow tonite. Lew is getting us local cell phones and ops will have numbers. Hopefully lew can also pass on numbers so you can reach us direct on tuesday and wednesday. We will be checking email periodically, but for the most part cell phones will be fastest way to reach us.

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DATE 11-29-2016 BY J76318780 NSICG

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HRC-1667

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-04-2019 BY C66W46B11 NSICG

From: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Thursday, September 30, 2010 8:50 AM
To: Jiloty, Lauren C; Coleman, Claire L; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: HbJ on moratorium

Doesn't need to be.
They can talk in code.

----- Original Message -----

From: Jiloty, Lauren C
To: Abedin, Huma; Coleman, Claire L; Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Thu Sep 30 08:47:29 2010
Subject: RE: HbJ on moratorium

HRC asked for secure, but up to you all

-----Original Message-----

From: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Thursday, September 30, 2010 8:44 AM
To: Jiloty, Lauren C; Coleman, Claire L; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: HbJ on moratorium

Does this call have to be secure?
Can we call now thru ops non-secure. Jake are u around?

----- Original Message -----

From: Jiloty, Lauren C
To: 'H' <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Cc: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Thu Sep 30 08:14:41 2010
Subject: RE: HbJ on moratorium

Jake can do 1:15 PM today - 2:15 PM today. He'll call the yellow phone when we tell him you are ready. Claire is working it into your schedule.

-----Original Message-----

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 30, 2010 8:22 AM
To: Jiloty, Lauren C [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: HbJ on moratorium

b6 per DOS

Thx. Pls schedule a secure call w Jake for me.

----- Original Message -----

From: Jiloty, Lauren C <JilotyLC@state.gov>
To: H
Sent: Thu Sep 30 07:51:22 2010
Subject: RE: HbJ on moratorium

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Received all 8

-----Original Message-----

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 30, 2010 7:54 AM
To: [REDACTED] Jiloty, Lauren C
Subject: Fw: HbJ on moratorium

b6 per DOS

Pls print.

----- Original Message -----

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
To: H
Sent: Mon Sep 20 12:17:51 2010
Subject: Fw: HbJ on moratorium

Fyi

----- Original Message -----

From: Feltman, Jeffrey D
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Hale, David M; Rudman, Mara; Walles, Jacob; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Sachar, Alon (NEA/IPA); Djerassi, Alexander M; Sanderson, Janet A; Schlicher, Ronald

b6 per DOS

L
Sent: Mon Sep 20 12:15:42 2010

Subject: HbJ on moratorium

b1 per DOS

I saw Qatari PM Hamad bin Jassim. [REDACTED]

Jeffrey Feltman

~~SECRET~~

From: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>
Sent: 8/30/2011 9:17:12 PM +00:00
To: "Mull, Stephen D" <MullSD@state.gov>; "Mills, Cheryl D" <MillsCD@state.gov>
CC: "Kennedy, Patrick F" <KennedyPF@state.gov>; "Hanley, Monica R" <HanleyMR@state.gov>
Subject: Re: S Communications

Steve - let's discuss the state blackberry, doesn't make a whole lot of sense.
As for the equipment, the current team was limited in some capacity because we did not have authorization from owners of residence to install equipment. We did it regardless. Additionally, as S knows, the team didn't have access to the property until a couple of hours before S arrived. Finally, as even the white house attested, this was a pretty wide spread problem, not just affecting us. So we should bear that in mind.

From: Mull, Stephen D
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 01:39 PM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Kennedy, Patrick F; Hanley, Monica R
Subject: S Communications

Cheryl,

Thanks again for alerting me to the communications issues the Secretary has been having. Here's a status report:

b7E per DOS

- On the immediate problem of the Secretary's not being able to have her calls transferred [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The technicians are onsite now [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- On the more long term issue, I've asked our team to develop an enhanced package of capabilities and equipment that we would propose deploying with the Secretary to be as closely co-located as possible with her when she is on travel away from her usual residences. The package will include things that anticipate the normally unexpected such as hurricanes, power outages, earthquakes, locusts, etc, such as generators, uninterrupted power supplies, supplementary satellite capabilities, including satellite phones for when local infrastructure fails (as it did in NY over the weekend).

Separately, we are working to provide the Secretary per her request a Department issued Blackberry to replace her personal unit which is malfunctioning (possibly because of her personal email server is down). We will prepare two versions for her to use – one with an operating State Department email account (which would mask her identity, but which would also be subject to FOIA requests), and another which would just have phone and internet capability. We're working with Monica to hammer out the details of what will best meet the Secretary's needs.

Please let me know if you need anything more for now, and I'll be in touch with the above longer term options soon.

Thanks,

Steve

PR_RIM_MESSAGE_SUBMISSION_ID:

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:

true

b6 per DOS
b7E per DOS

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID:

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:

-5

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:

1373676228

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:

true

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:

1

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~~SECRET~~

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-05028 Doc No. C05891070 Date: 11/12/2015

RELEASE IN PART
B1,1.4(G),1.4(E),B7(C),B6,1.4(C)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~
DECL: 03/02/2019

INFORMATION MEMO FOR CHERYL D. MILLS - S

FROM: DS - Eric J. Boswell

SUBJECT: Use of Blackberries in Mahogany Row

We have worked closely [redacted] to review all options that would allow Secretary Clinton, you, and a small number of staff to use Blackberries [redacted]

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

(S) b1 per DOS

[redacted] Our review reaffirms our belief that the vulnerabilities and risks associated with the use of Blackberries in the Mahogany Row [redacted] considerably outweigh the convenience their use can add to staff that have access to the unclassified OpenNet system on their desktops. [redacted]

(S) 1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

[redacted] We also worry about the example that using Blackberries in Mahogany Row might set as we strive to promote crucial security practices and enforce important security standards among State Department staff.

As an alternative, we suggest that DS work with S/ES-IRM to make access to the Secretary's OpenNet account on her desktop workstation as easy and convenient as possible. For example, we are happy to work with IRM to lengthen or even eliminate the time-out function to allow the Secretary's Special Assistant to log-on to review her emails and schedules.

(S) [redacted] While we cannot recommend using Blackberries inside the Mahogany Row we do not want to stand in the way of issuing Department Blackberries to the Secretary and her senior staff for use outside Mahogany Row. Those Blackberries can be synchronized with your OpenNet Microsoft Outlook accounts, provide full cellular, e-mail, and internet functionality, and provide unclassified mobile technology when you are away from Mahogany Row.

b1 per DOS

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

I cannot stress too strongly, however, that any unclassified Blackberry is highly vulnerable in any setting to remotely and covertly monitoring conversations, retrieving e-mails, and exploiting calendars. I am attaching reports from DS's

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Classified by: DS - Eric J. Boswell
E.O. 12958; Reasons: 1.4 (C), (d), and (e)

DS/10

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-05028 Doc No. C05891070 Date: 11/12/2015

HRC-1674

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

-2-

Office of Computer Security's Cyber Threat & Analysis Division that give further background on those risks.

b1 per DOS

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

If, after considering the vulnerabilities that I describe above and the alternatives that I propose, the Secretary determines that she wants a limited number of staff to use Blackberries in the Mahogany Row

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

b1 per DOS

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Excerpts from DS/CS/CTAD Reports on Blackberry Vulnerabilities

Tab 2 -

1.4(C)

Tab 3 - New York Times Article: "Obama's Phone Security and Yours"

1.4(E)

Tab 4 - Washington Post Article: "Your Cell and Your Berry: Tools for the Enemy"

1.4(G)
B1

b1 per DOS

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Drafted: DS/SI/IS
DS/C/ST



b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Cleared: DS/DSS - G.Starr (ok)
DS/SI/CS - M.Holland (ok)
DS/SI - D.Reid (ok)
DS/C - P.Donovan (ok)
INR - [redacted] (ok)
M - [redacted] (ok)
IRM - [redacted] (ok)

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

~~SECRET~~

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HRC:1679

From: Huma Abedin

Sent: 6/17/2011 7:17:55 PM +00:00

To: Oscar Flores

b6 per DOS

CC: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

Subject: Oscar - pouch coming closer to 5pm fyi

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: false

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: 31482329

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -5

PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE: true

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6: true

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID:

b6 per DOS

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DATE 11-29-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

HRC-1681

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, October 17, 2009 12:38 PM
To: H
Subject: Secure fax

There are 2 draft letters from mara being faxed to secure fax right now. Oscar will receive.
Also, norwegian fm stoere wants to talk tomorrow. He will be in aghanistan.

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DATE 11-29-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

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HRC-1683

From: Hanley, Monica R <HanleyMR@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 10:59 AM
To: H
Cc: Huma Abedin
Subject: Jalil FINAL call sheet


Jake has made some changes and here is the final call sheet. Marina will bring you the copy that we faxed over.

The Secretary's Call Sheet for

Transitional National Council Chairman Abdel Jalil

Purpose of call: To express American support and solidarity with Jalil and the TNC on the historic events unfolding in Libya and to encourage him to use his leadership to support a peaceful, transparent, and inclusive transition to democracy.

b5 per DOS



Background: TNC Chairman Abdel Jalil is the widely respected and mild-mannered leader of the Transitional National Council, considered the "anti-Qadhafi." He announced the arrest of Qadhafi's son, Saif al-Islami, by rebel forces August 21 and is reportedly preparing now for an address to the Libyan people on the end of Qadhafi's reign. While the TNC has said they are committed to avoiding bloodshed and retributive violence, it is important now that Abdel Jalil make a national appeal to Libyans to do so. You sent him a letter encouraging the consolidation of control over the militias and a credible investigation of General Younis' killing, which was hand-delivered by A/S Feltman August 20.

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HRC-1686

From: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>
Sent: 7/2/2009 3:55:51 PM +00:00
To:

b6 per DOS

Pdb will come to secure fax 10am fri and sat

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: false

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -5

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: 1746680797

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE true

_3_6:

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1

PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DE true

VICE:

Yes - ops will connect yang call to residence at 10am
Will let u know about spain.

-----Original Message-----

From: H <hdr22@clintonemail.com>

To: Huma Abedin

Sent: Sat Mar 21 07:49:26 2009

Subject: Re: Tomorrow

Can we do Yang call at 10? If not, can we do tomorrow morning?

You can also add Spanish FM except btw 11-1 and after 7.

From: Huma Abedin

Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2009 21:30:25 -0400

To: <hdr22@clintonemail.com>

Subject: Tomorrow

Just to confirm for tomorrow:

- press clips and overnight brief will come in the morning. Oscar will print for you
- pdb will arrive at 10am on the secure fax. U will have to pick up phone and go secure. Because of the nature of what is coming, oscar is not able to do do this.
- yang call can happen at 10am. Can we confirm that? U have a call sheet (has a secret cover).
- what should we do with spanish fm? We can hold till monday.

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From: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>
Sent: 6/23/2011 12:04:08 PM +00:00
To: 'humamabedin' [REDACTED]
Subject: Marina print
Attachments: Libya TP v6.docx; 062311 Libya QAs for Use with Congress 62311 bnc.docx

b6 per DOS

----- Original Message -----

From: Mills, Cheryl D
Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2011 08:01 AM
To: Abedin, Huma
Cc: 'H' <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Subject: FW: Libya Prep Documents - Top Line and Q/A for 8:30am Call with S

Huma

For printing for HRC for call in 30 minutes.

Thanks.

cdm

-----Original Message-----

From: Mills, Cheryl D
Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2011 7:59 AM
To: Adams, David S; Koh, Harold Hongju; Hammer, Michael A; Reines, Philippe I; Nuland, Victoria J; Nides, Thomas R; McDonough, Denis R.
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J; Burns, William J; Steinberg, James B; Mills, Cheryl D; Crocker, Bathsheba N; Wells, Alice G; Abedin, Huma; Valmoro, Lona J
Subject: Libya Prep Documents - Top Line and Q/A for 8:30am Call with S

Please review attached for call and per note below, will incorporate any fixes after 8:30am call with S.

Please call into Ops at 8:25am.

Thanks.

cdm

-----Original Message-----

From: Crocker, Bathsheba N
Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2011 7:55 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J; Burns, William J; Steinberg, James B
Subject: Libya -- both docs -- latest

All:

Attached is very latest of S statement and QA, attempting to incorporate all additional edits.

We'll make any additional needed fixes after 830 call.

HRC-1691

Sheba

b6 per DOS
b7E per DOS

PR_RIM_MESSAGE_SUBMI

SSION_ID:

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: true

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESS

AGE_ID:

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -5

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: 231356429

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE true

_3_6:

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1

HRC-1692

16

From: "Hanley, Monica R" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/HANLEYMR>
Sent: 8/30/2011 10:09:28 PM +00:00
To: "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.gov>
Subject: Re: S berry

Do you want a different address?

----- Original Message -----

From: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 05:19 PM
To: Hanley, Monica R
Subject: Re: S berry

That can't be it.

----- Original Message -----

From: Hanley, Monica R
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 04:19 PM
To: Abedin, Huma
Subject: Fw: S berry

SSHRC@state.gov

----- Original Message -----

From: Bentel, John A
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 04:15 PM
To: Hanley, Monica R
Subject: RE: S berry

Monica: We actually have an account previously set up: SSHRC@state.gov. There are some old emails but none since Jan '11 -- we could get rid of them. You should be aware that any email would go through the Department's infrastructure and subject to FOIA searches.

Let me know if any questions and what you would like us to do.

Thanks!
John

SBU
This email is UNCLASSIFIED

-----Original Message-----

From: Hanley, Monica R
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 3:59 PM
To: Bentel, John A
Subject: S berry

Do you know what her email address would be on a state dept berry?

From: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Thursday, December 16, 2010 6:45 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Cc: Hanley, Monica R
Subject: RE: mail from clintonemail

Ok I will call her in the am
And give her all details

From: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Thursday, December 16, 2010 6:45 PM
To: Abedin, Huma
Cc: Hanley, Monica R
Subject: RE: mail from clintonemail

We met today. What she needs is an email that is not going through so that she can check where it gets blocked. She also wants the name of the clintonemail administrator.

From: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Thursday, December 16, 2010 6:41 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Cc: Hanley, Monica R
Subject: RE: mail from clintonemail

Cindy said the exact same thing to me 2 weeks go
But this is a real problem
It is happening a lot even though we have changed
I will call cindy and resolve with her tomorrow morning

From: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Thursday, December 16, 2010 6:38 PM
To: Abedin, Huma
Cc: Hanley, Monica R
Subject: FW: mail from clintonemail

Not sure how to handle this cuz it's really HRC emails.

From: Almodovar, Cindy T
Sent: Thursday, December 16, 2010 3:23 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: mail from clintonemail

Hi, Jake.

IRM has been doing a lot of investigative work on messages from clintonemail.com addresses and I can look anything delivered say in the past month.

Can you send me any information about a message you might not have received? You mentioned that you don't get messages from Huma.

you could send me just the subject line or approximate date/time of a message, I can work with that.

Thanks, Cindy.



Cindy Trodden Almodovar

S/ES Supervisory Systems Administrator

S/ES-IRM POEMS Help Desk

U.S. Department of State

Phone: 202-647-8328 | Fax: 202-647-8191

From: Justin G Cooper [redacted]
Sent: 10/30/2011 4:00:04 AM +00:00
To: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>
Subject: Re:

b6 per DOS

I hope some time tomorrow. Out of my control. But if it looks to be long term I will have to route it through another server.

-----Original Message-----

From: Huma Abedin
To: [redacted]
Subject: Re:
Sent: Oct 29, 2011 11:58 PM

b6 per DOS

I noticed it a while ago, was just about to text you.
Let me know when u think it will be back up.

----- Original Message -----


From: Justin G Cooper [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Saturday, October 29, 2011 11:52 PM
To: Abedin, Huma

b6 per DOS

Fyi clintonemail.com is down due to an outage with our ISP.
Our actual systems are up.
If it looks to be long term ie past tomorrow I will reroute the mail.
U or oscar can tell hrc

Message Headers:

b6 per DOS
b7E per DOS



HRC-1701

From: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>
Sent: 1/9/2011 7:05:02 PM +00:00
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Re:

b6 per DOS

omg.

----- Original Message -----

From: Justin Cooper [REDACTED]
To: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Sun Jan 09 02:57:16 2011
Subject:

b6 per DOS

I had to shut down the server
Someone was trying to hack us and while they did not get in i didnt want to let them have the chance to.
I will restart it in the morning.

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: false

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -5

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: 934001673

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE true

_3_6:

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1

PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DE true

VICE:

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HRC-1704

From: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>
Sent: 1/10/2011 6:30:30 AM +00:00
To: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; "Mills, Cheryl D" <MillsCD@state.gov>
Subject: Don't email hrc anything sensitive. I can explain more in person.

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: false

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -5

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: 2108801984

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE true

_3_6:

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1

PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DE

VICE: true

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-29-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

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HRC-1706

From: Huma Abedin

Sent: 4/2/2012 10:50:02 PM +00:00

To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>


Subject: May - Asia

and its not impossible. you will get a hard copy tomorrow but i am not sending through the system or it will go all over the building. it has the schedule options that geoff pyatt and i suggest at the end.

b5 per DOS

b5 per DOS

HRC-1714




Attachment:

Potential Itineraries

POTENTIAL ITINERARIES

Option 1:

b5 per DOS




A large rectangular box with a black border, completely empty, representing redacted content.

Option 2:

A large rectangular box with a black border, completely empty, representing redacted content.

b5 per DOS

Option 3:

A large rectangular box with a black border, completely empty, representing redacted content.

b5 per DOS

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DATE 11-29-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICC

HRC-1718

[redacted]

and its not b5 per DOS

impossible. you will get a hard copy tomorrow but i am not sending through the system or it will go all over the building. it has the schedule options that geoff pyatt and i suggest at the end.

b5 per DOS

[redacted]



b5 per DOS

Attachment:

Potential Itineraries

POTENTIAL ITINERARIES

Option 1:



b5 per DOS

Option 2:



b5 per DOS

b5 per DOS

Option 3:

b5 per DOS

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:

true

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:

-838589299

HRC-1722

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:

-5

PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:

true

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:

true

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:

1

b6 per DOS

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID:

--

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DATE 11-29-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

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HRC-1724

RELEASE IN PART
1.4(B),B1,B5,1.4(D)

From: Feltman, Jeffrey D <FeltmanJD@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, January 8, 2011 11:16 AM
To: H; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: AG points from Jeff

B1
1.4(D)

The references I've seen are PJ's comments from before the meeting (before the King's request).
The only "post meeting" briefs I've seen relate to someone on Saad's team talking about the Hariri meeting.
Have you seen something else?
Jeffrey Feltman

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>; Feltman, Jeffrey D
Sent: Sat Jan 08 11:05:18 2011
Subject: Re: AG points from Jeff

B1
1.4(D)
B5

I think I could
Also, in the articles about my mtg w the King, they reported I had discussed Lebanon

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
To: H
Sent: Sat Jan 08 11:00:05 2011
Subject: AG points from Jeff

B1
1.4(B)
1.4(D)
B5

Jeffrey Feltman

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 09/30/2015 ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason: 1.4(B), 1.4(D) ~ Declassify on: 01/07/2036

HRC-1725

~~SECRET~~

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-04-2019 BY C66W46P11 NSICG

From: Feltman, Jeffrey D <FeltmanJD@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, January 8, 2011 11:16 AM
To: H; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: AG points from Jeff

b1 per DOS

The references I've seen are PJ's comments from before the meeting (before the King's request) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The only "post meeting" briefs I've seen relate to someone on Saad's team talking about the Hariri meeting. [REDACTED] Have you seen something else?
Jeffrey Feltman

(S)

(S)

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>; Feltman, Jeffrey D
Sent: Sat Jan 08 11:05:18 2011
Subject: Re: AG points from Jeff

b1 per DOS
b5 per DOS

I think I could [REDACTED]
Also, in the articles about my mtg w the King, they reported I had discussed Lebanon [REDACTED]

(S)

(S)

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
To: H
Sent: Sat Jan 08 11:00:05 2011
Subject: AG points from Jeff

b1 per DOS
b5 per DOS

Jeffrey Feltman

(S)

~~SECRET~~

25

~~SECRET//REL FVEY~~

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2011 10:14 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Stevens Update (important)

Importance: High

Jake may have sent but in case not..

----- Original Message -----

From: Davis, Timmy T
Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2011 06:48 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Abedin, Huma; Wells, Alice G; S_SpecialAssistants
Subject: Stevens Update (important)

(SBU) Per Special Envoy Stevens:

- The situation in Ajdabiyah has worsened to the point where Stevens is considering departure from Benghazi. The envoy's delegation is currently doing a phased checkout (paying the hotel bills, moving some comms to the boat, etc). He will monitor the situation to see if it deteriorates further, but no decision has been made on departure. He will wait 2-3 more hours, then revisit the decision on departure.

- He received reports of shelling last night in Ajdabiyah as well as snipers shooting people in the city. AFRICOM reported Qadhafi's forces took the eastern and western gates of Ajdabiyah, with 5 vehicles at the eastern gate and 50 at the western gate. More Qadhafi forces are heading to Ajdabiyah from Brega.

- The Brits report Qadhafi forces are moving from Sirte to Brega, which they interpret as preparation for another assault on Ajdabiyah today.

- He plans to discuss the situation further with the Brits, Turks, and the TNC to see if this is an irreversible situation. Departure would send a significant political signal, and would be interpreted as the U.S. losing confidence in the TNC. Initial message to the TNC would frame the departure as due to security grounds and as a temporary measure only.

- Polaschik said she would discuss these developments with Amb. Cretz.

- If the group departs, the contract for the boat stipulates they return to Greece. One scenario could be the group stages elsewhere for a few days.

Ops will continue to monitor the situation.

~~SECRET//REL FVEY~~

HRC-1728

RELEASE IN
FULL

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2011 10:14 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Stevens Update (Important)

Importance: High

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-29-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICC

26

HRC-1730

~~SECRET~~

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, July 4, 2009 7:42 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

Fyi

From: Beale, Courtney A Kramer
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; [REDACTED] Abedin, Huma; Mills, Cheryl D b6 per DOS
Cc: S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E
Sent: Sat Jul 04 07:35:08 2009
Subject: Fw: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

FYI on Japanese statement on North Korean missile launches.

From: Pascual, Michael T
To: Smith-Wilson, Shelby V; SES_DutyDeputies; Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Park, Pamela P; S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E
Cc: SES-O_SWO-Only; Rosenberger, Laura M
Sent: Sat Jul 04 02:03:32 2009
Subject: RE: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

Further to Shelby's email, Embassy Tokyo forward the following unofficial translation of a statement issued by Japanese MOFA:

MOFA released a press announcement at 13:00. (MOFA: G-0738)
July 4, 2009

Regarding Japan's protest against the launch of a ballistic missile by North Korea.

Through the diplomatic route in Beijing, around 12:00 noon Japan sent North Korea the following message regarding today's North Korean ballistic missile launch:

1. The launch of a ballistic missile by North Korea is a significant act of provocation in terms of the security of neighboring countries, including our country, and a violation of UNSCR 1895, 1718 and 1874. Concerning today's launch of a ballistic missile, Japan strictly protests, and expresses sincere regret.
2. Japan urges North Korea to implement all related UNSC Resolutions, including suspension of all activities related to the ballistic missile plan immediately and completely. In addition, on this occasion, (we) strongly urge (North Korea) again to take concrete action toward the comprehensive resolution of related issues, such as the abduction issue, the nuclear issue and the missile issue.


From: Smith-Wilson, Shelby V
Sent: Saturday, July 04, 2009 12:13 AM
To: SES_DutyDeputies; Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Park, Pamela P; S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E
Cc: SES-O_SWO-Only; Rosenberger, Laura M
Subject: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

To clarify a few points below:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b5 per DOS



From: Smith-Wilson, Shelby V

Sent: Friday, July 03, 2009 11:42 PM

To: SES_DutyDeputies; Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Park, Pamela P; S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E


Cc: SES-O_SWO-Only; Rosenberger, Laura M

Subject: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

b1 per DOS

b5 per DOS

Dan,



(S)

~~SECRET~~

HRC-1732

~~SECRET~~

(S)

Shelby Smith-Wilson
Senior Watch Officer
U.S. Department of State (S/ES-O)
202-647-1512

~~SECRET~~

RELEASE IN PART B1,1.4(B),1.4(C),1.4(D),,B5,B6

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, July 04, 2009 7:42 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

Fyi Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 02/29/2016 ~ Class: ~~SECRET~~ ~ Reason: 1.4(B), 1.4(C), 1.4(D) ~ Declassify on: 07/03/2034

From: Beale, Courtney A. Kramer
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; 'jake.sullivan' [redacted] Abedin, Huma; Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E
Sent: Sat Jul 04 07:35:08 2009
Subject: Fw: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

86

FYI on Japanese statement on North Korean missile launches.

From: Pascual, Michael T
To: Smith-Wilson, Shelby V; SES_DutyDeputies; Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Park, Pamela P; S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E
Cc: SES-O_SWO-Only; Rosenberger, Laura M
Sent: Sat Jul 04 02:03:32 2009
Subject: RE: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

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Sent: Saturday, July 04, 2009 12:13 AM
To: SES_DutyDeputies; Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Park, Pamela P; S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E
Cc: SES-O_SWO-Only; Rosenberger, Laura M
Subject: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

To clarify a few points below:

B5

From: Smith-Wilson, Shelby V
Sent: Friday, July 03, 2009 11:42 PM
To: SES_DutyDeputies; Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Park, Pamela P; S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E
Cc: SES-O_SWO-Only; Rosenberger, Laura M
Subject: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

Dan.

1.4(B)
1.4(C)
1.4(D)
B1
B5

B5

Shelby Smith-Wilson
Senior Watch Officer
U.S. Department of State (S/ES-O)
202-647-1512

From: H

Sent: 11/25/2009 9:31:38 AM +00:00

To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>

Subject: Fw: MEMO: Good idea on Afghanistan. Sid

Attachments: hrc memo afghan 112409.docx

Pls print.

----- Original Message -----

From: [REDACTED]
To: H
Sent: Tue Nov 24 17:58:21 2009
Subject: MEMO: Good idea on Afghanistan. Sid

b6 per DOS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 24, 2009

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Afghanistan

Bill Murray, former CIA station chief in Pakistan, one member of the small group that ran the war against the Soviets, has sent me a new memo based on a recent conversation we had. He reiterates some of the ideas I've already told you, but also has one big new idea of how to explain the US policy to the Afghans—holding a series of loya jirgas in Pashtun areas. I also like the "ask" in the last paragraph.

Memo for Sidney
Thoughts on Afghanistan
From: Bill Murray
Date: 24 November 2009

HRC-1738

I did not want to send this to you over the international open circuits so I waited to write it after I got back last night. Unexpectedly, the day after I spoke with you I spoke to the British Prime Minister's adviser on Afghanistan. The introduction was made by a retired British Vice Admiral at a speech we were both attending. The Vice Admiral told the other officer, whose name I never properly heard, about my background and involvement in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Coincidentally, former President Musharraf of Pakistan was at the same event and spent some time with us both. The British are going through the same process our government is going through and the officer said they have been paying the Taliban for some time and know they are going to have to pay more. He asked me what I thought and I said paying them is just rent and there is going to have to be some kind of political agreement. I suggested a series of loya jirga in each of the areas the British are working in, just as I am suggesting it to you below.

You already know my thoughts on much of this:

A very simple and clearly enunciated policy such as we came here to stop further attacks on the US.

We will leave when we have located and retrieved those who attacked us, Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and received assurances that Afghanistan will not again be a safe haven for those who want to attack us.

I believe that the message needs to be short, clear and perfectly understandable to the Pathan/Pushtun ethnic group that makes up 40% of the population and that is currently fighting us. I also believe that the best way to get the point across is to have a series of tribally based loya jirga in the Pathan/Pushtun areas. Forget about a big national level meeting in Kabul. That will just be seen as an attempt by the US to consolidate the power of Hamid Karzai or to create some kind of national strong central structure these people will never accept. They have and can live with a weak central government and powerful regional governments. They have never had or accepted any attempt to establish a strong central government. The Pathans are divided between a northern and southern group (hence the 2 different ways the word is written and pronounced) and further divided along tribal lines. They will not agree as a unified group because there is no unity among them, but they can be dealt with tribe by tribe and region by region. We will inevitably have to pardon leaders who are currently shooting at us, and we just need to get used to the idea. Not long ago I listened to a US military briefer describing political groups such as the Hizbi Islami, as terrorist organizations. I am sure he had no idea that there is more than one Hizbi Islami (literally Party of Islam) or that the US aided both of them during the struggle against the Soviet Union. We cannot win, or extricate ourselves from, this kind of war with this level of ignorance. We need to get down to where the Afghans are and deal with them in terms they understand. We also cannot get anywhere by sending out as our representatives people who cannot even attempt to pronounce their names. I heard the same briefer try to pronounce Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's name then give up and say "we just call him Gubdin." We need to create a small group of diplomats, intelligence officers and military - teams led by the diplomats not the military - who really have some area and cultural knowledge and then use them to deal with the Afghans. The loya jirga is not pretty nor is it efficient but it is, in its own way, democratic and it is the Afghan way to make arrive at group consensus.

I also believe that we should demand that Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri be turned over to us. If we try to leave without getting these guys we will be seen as weak and irresolute and our word on other issues will not be trusted. Despite what they say about not believing that these guys were behind 9-11 the Afghan leaders know the truth. They will also say they cannot violate their own code of honor under which the Arabs were offered sanctuary. Anything and everything is for sale in Afghanistan if we can just fix the price. The al-Qaida leaders violated the sanctuary given to them by bringing their war to Afghanistan. Any obligations the Afghans felt toward them have run out.

Message Headers:

[Redacted]
From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2009 04:31:38 -0500 b6 per DOS
Subject: Fw: MEMO: Good idea on Afghanistan. Sid

[Redacted]

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:	773169548
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:	-3
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:	1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-29-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

From: Huma Abedin
Sent: 3/9/2011 12:56:35 PM +00:00
To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Re: H: serious trouble for Libyan rebels. Sid

Yes

From: H
Sent: Wednesday, March 09, 2011 07:54 AM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Fw: H: serious trouble for Libyan rebels. Sid

Can you print for me w/o any identifiers?

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, March 09, 2011 07:06 AM
To: H
Subject: H: serious trouble for Libyan rebels. Sid

b6 per DOS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 9, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Serious problems for Libyan rebels

The latest report:

(Source Comment: Private individuals in Europe, with ties to the leadership of the National Libyan Council (NLC), plan to urge the NLC military committee to consider hiring private troops (mercenaries) to support, organize, and train the rebel forces in Libya. These individuals believe that NATO and the Western allies will not make a decision to aid the

HRC-1742

rebels until they are faced with a humanitarian disaster, and that the revolution is in danger. At the same time, these individuals believe a small number of private troops could turn the battle against Qaddafi's forces, particularly if they are equipped with sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons. These individuals also believe that experienced troops will have little trouble shooting down Libyan aircraft and attack helicopters. In the opinion of these sources, this would have a devastating psychological affect on Qaddafi's troops.)

During the afternoon of March 8, individuals with access to Saif al Islam Qaddafi stated in confidence that Muammar al Qaddafi is increasingly confident that his troops can drive back rebel forces attempting to advance on Tripoli from Benghazi. According to these individuals, Qaddafi continues to believe that, if he and his supporters can hold on to power for the next two weeks, the morale of the rebel forces will begin to falter, while the opposition NLC, and the tribal leaders will begin to fight among themselves.

Knowledgeable individuals with access to the European security community state that they believe reports that Qaddafi may be preparing to flee the country are false. That said, they add that, in their opinion, the NATO surveillance of Libya will be able to tell if and when Qaddafi does prepare to leave. They add that to date there appears to be no activity indicating that such a move is about to take place.

(Source Comment: According to knowledgeable individuals, military commanders loyal to Qaddafi, including his son Khamis, are surprised that NATO and the other Western military organizations have not taken a more direct hand in the fighting. They continue to be concerned over this possibility, particularly in the wake of the capture of Dutch Marines west of Tripoli, and reports of British Special Forces troops being detained by rebel forces near Benghazi, while attempting to contact the NLC. That said, these military commanders still believe that NATO, and particularly the United States are using satellite imagery and other sophisticated surveillance devices to monitor the military situation in Libya. They have warned Qaddafi, that although the Western powers appear to be reluctant to enter the fighting, this surveillance can identify anti-aircraft facilities and other sensitive targets, and allows NATO commanders to move quickly if they decide to implement a no fly zone over Libya, or become more directly involved in aiding the rebels. Qaddafi remains confident that NATO and the Western allies will continue to debate a course of action for the immediate future. He also assured his commanders that neither the Arab League nor the Organization of African Unity (OAU) would participate in, or support any attack on Libya. Finally, according to these sources, Qaddafi believes that Russia and China will not support any action that involves increasing the military role the United States or NATO.)

In Benghazi, individuals with access to the NLC state in confidence that despite the best efforts of the NLC, a unified governing body has yet to emerge. At present, NLC leader Mustafa Abdel Galil is experiencing limited success in his efforts attract members of the academic and student movements to the NLC. Galil is from the town of Albeida, northeast of Benghazi and has family and traditional ties to many academic and civic leaders in the region. The leaders of the el-Senussi family continues to assert that they should be the basis for an interim government. Galil and his supporters reject this, and only one member of the el-Senussi has been allowed to work with the

NLC. (Source Comment: This individual was imprisoned by Qaddafi for many years and is respected by all sides.).

PORTS:

Individuals with access to the military committee of the NLC stated in confidence that as of March 8 the major Libyan oil ports of Ras Lanuf and Brega in the eastern part of the country are closed. The Libyan army fought rebels for control of Ras Lanuf on March 7 and a rebel official reported that a captured Libyan Army officer stated that Qaddafi would attack oil fields if he believes that the rebels were winning the conflict.

On Saturday, March 5 a Turkish owned vessel left Ras Lanuf with over 500,000 barrels of crude oil. Sources with access to the NLC stated that this was the last cargo vessel to sail from that port. (Source Comment: These individuals said that on March 7 the NLC received word that the port of Tobruk was operational. Various sources reported on March 7 that the general cargo ports of Tripoli, Benghazi and Khoms were operational.)

The NLC sources add that many of the oil ports appear to be closed, and too dangerous to use. During the week of February 28 London's marine insurance market added Libya to a list of areas deemed high risk.

OIL PRODUCTION

According to The International Energy Agency, before the uprising Libyan wells pumped around 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd). As of Friday, 1 million bpd of this oil production was lost, after foreign oil firms evacuated their workers.

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:	false
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:	1700091791
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:	-5
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:	1

b6 per DOS

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID:

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 8:21 AM
To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
Subject: Re: [REDACTED]

b5 per DOS

If they can't, turn into nonpaper w no identifying heading and send nonsecure.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 08:17 AM
To: H
Subject: Re: [REDACTED]

b5 per DOS

They say they've had issues sending secure fax. They're working on it.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 08:00 AM
To: 'HDR22@clintonemail.com' <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Re: [REDACTED]

b5 per DOS

?!!! Checking

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 07:52 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: [REDACTED]

b5 per DOS

I didn't get the TPs yet.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 05:51 PM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Plan for PC tomorrow

You'll get tps this eve. They're coming together.

From: Spence, Matthew J. [mailto:[REDACTED]]
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 04:15 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

b5 per DOS

[illegible]

0 TWAa0 a' QoD | . { } 0 0 *ZXL > r0 0 nD s gaD QD | ^X L' Q/H- W 0 0 0 +0 0 OafD +
n 7f2 87f AE 0 uht 0 d' 0 0 0IP? XxTzTH | f (>J -d fiQ □Y+□fz **** f >J -d A*a

0Huma Abedin] 0Yt0Jw 75a0 P 0W0 1 PK0 8XhE ZHUMA y 0 7f 0? {t Vt Vt St8tp q; tB Y8t 6 Tt
0?@9 0? v@ Mg of MSFTFF ! 8o 0 9 *9 09 q: 0 ; 30 ZJonJon DavidsonJon

Ok. I have some classified papers. Could I leave them in your car when he goes inside? — Original Message

From: Jon Davidson
Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2012 06:02 PM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Re:

(----- Original Message -----)
From: Huma Abedin;
Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2012 06:00 PM
To: Jon Davidson
Subject:

[REDACTED] (WT-U*Ä-ÄA b6 per DOS
 .I U6
 ° yyyO » 0yyyI !p T09a° |*** Ä>J ÚI- #)'@Ä±BEÄ?ç: d@ @@
 !%) - 1A& ç. èA/ B0 RB3 ÄE5)F6 EF; F < GCK O S» WCXÊYÉ]°

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-0)

File Number

[Redacted]

1A

43

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WF

Serial # of Originating Document

123

Date Received

Various

From

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

SA

[Redacted]

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

1A43

MID YEAR EXAM;

MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☐ Original notes re interview of

Attorney correspondence

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)

b6
b7c

From: [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 2:55 PM
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Letter
Attachments: 2015.10.28 - DOJ to Wilmer.pdf

For the file. More to follow.

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 2:03 PM
To: Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (USAVAE); [REDACTED] (USAVAE); [REDACTED] (NSD) (JMD)
Subject: FW: Letter

b6 per FBI, NSD
b7C per FBI, NSD

FYI.

From: [REDACTED] (NSD)
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 2:00 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Letter

b6 per FBI, NSD
b7C per FBI, NSD

[REDACTED]
Attached find a letter responding to your letter of October 16, 2015.
Best,

[REDACTED]
Counterintelligence and Export Control Section
National Security Division
U.S. Department of Justice

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Phone [REDACTED]



U.S. Department of Justice

National Security Division

Washington, D.C. 20530

BY EMAIL



b6
b7C

October 28, 2015

Dear 

b6
b7C

This letter confirms receipt of the letter you sent me on October 16, 2015, as well as the enclosed spreadsheet identifying thirty (30) emails produced to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by Mr. Cooper that did not meet our agreed-upon criteria for production. As we have discussed, the FBI will mark the thirty emails you identified in this spreadsheet such that, going forward, they will not be reviewed on any image of the materials that is in the possession of the FBI.

Sincerely,



b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

HRC-2767

[REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI) b6
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015, 2:55 PM b7C
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI);
(FBI); [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Letter
Attachments: Kendall Oct 16 Letter to [REDACTED].PDF

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 3:00 PM
To: Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI);
[REDACTED] (RO) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (NSD) (JMD); [REDACTED] (USAVAE); [REDACTED] (USAVAE)
Subject: FW: Letter b6 per FBI, NSD
b7C per FBI, NSD

All,

See attached letter from W&C. [REDACTED] will be in touch to give you details for pick up, but Katherine Turner should be available to provide these items at 4:00 today. Also note that the email below includes an addition to the privilege list provided by W&C. We have already worked through the financial consultant issue, but please make sure that the email is passed along to [REDACTED] and the DOJ filter attorneys for their records.

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Thanks,

-----Original Message-----

From: Kendall, David [mailto:DKendall@wc.com]
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015, 2:42 PM
To: [REDACTED] (NSD)
Cc: [REDACTED] (NSD)
Subject: Letter

Dear [REDACTED] b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Please see the attached letter.

I write here to supplement my September 25, 2015 letter setting forth the list of individuals with whom Secretary Clinton may have communicated in a privileged context. [REDACTED] should be added to the "Personal Financial Consultant" section of that list. Thank you.

Sincerely,

David Kendall

David E. Kendall
Williams & Connolly LLP
725 Twelfth Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20005
(P) 202-434-5145 | (F) 202-434-5029

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LAW OFFICES
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
725 TWELFTH STREET, N.W.

DAVID E. KENDALL
(202) 434-5145
dkendall@wc.com

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005-5901

(202) 434-5000

FAX (202) 434-5029

EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS (1920-1986)
PAUL R. CONNOLLY (1922-1978)

October 16, 2015

BY E-MAIL

[REDACTED]
U.S. Department of Justice
National Security Division
905 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Dear [REDACTED]

Pursuant to our conversation yesterday, this letter will give the Department of Justice consent (1) to search any files of Secretary Clinton, dated January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013, that may be located on the equipment provided to the FBI today (specifically, a 32GB iPad, a T-Mobile Blackberry, and an AT&T Blackberry (the "devices")) for evidence relevant to the investigation of the matter referred by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community; and (2) to conduct a forensic analysis of the devices, for purposes of identifying evidence relevant to that investigation.

In voluntarily providing these devices to the Department, we, of course, are doing so solely with regard to any files of Secretary Clinton that may be located on the devices, and not with regard to the files of any other individuals.

Further, we note that we provide these devices with the understanding that, as stated in your October 4, 2015 letter to [REDACTED] and me, all items voluntarily produced to the FBI will be returned to the owners or disposed of consistent with FBI policies and procedures at the conclusion of its investigation.

b6
b7C

Sincerely,


David E. Kendall

HRC-2770

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

b6
b7C

From: [redacted] (RO) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 3:06 PM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (FBI); [redacted]
Subject: FW: Kendall Letter
Attachments: Kendall Oct 14 Letter to [redacted].PDF

To file

b6 per FBI, NSD
b7C per FBI, NSD

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 12:57 PM
To: Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (RO) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (NSD) (JMD); [redacted] (USAVAE); [redacted] (USAVAE)
Subject: FW: Kendall Letter

See attached letter. We can discuss later today or tomorrow. Hoping we can sit down to discuss a few items - [redacted] was going to check availability.

From: Kendall, David [mailto:DKendall@wc.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 12:24 PM
To: [redacted] (NSD)
Cc: [redacted] (NSD)
Subject: Kendall Letter

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Dear [redacted]

Please find attached a letter, which I am sending by post and by e-mail.

Sincerely,

David Kendall

David E. Kendall
Williams & Connolly LLP
725 Twelfth Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20005
(P) 202-434-5145 | (F) 202-434-5029
dkendall@wc.com | www.wc.com/dkendall

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005-5901

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FAX (202) 434-5029

DAVID E. KENDALL

(202) 434-5145

dkendall@wc.com

EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS (1920-1988)
PAUL R. CONNOLLY (1922-1978)

October 14, 2015

BY EMAIL AND FIRST CLASS MAIL

[REDACTED]
United States Department of Justice
National Security Division
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Dear [REDACTED]

We have made a good-faith effort to identify equipment or devices that might contain or might have contained emails from the time period January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013 (the "relevant time period") to or from any @clintonemail.com domain account assigned to former Secretary Clinton. Based on information we have access to, we can report the following.

We have identified two Blackberry devices and one iPad that we believe the former Secretary may have used during the relevant time period.

In connection with your request, we also note that we understand that in 2008 and early 2009, an Apple computer stored in the Clinton's Chappaqua home was used as an email server. We have been unable to determine whether that Apple computer ever functioned as a server for the @clintonemail.com domain account in early 2009, prior to the March 2009 installation of the Dell server that we provided to the Department of Justice in August 2015. Based upon our best information, we do not believe that it did, but cannot rule out that possibility. We believe that the Apple computer was repurposed after the installation of the Dell server in March 2009, to serve as a personal computer for household staff. The Apple computer was replaced in 2014 by an iMac, to which its then-existing data was transferred. Thereafter, the hard drive of the Apple computer was discarded. The iMac is currently in daily use by household staff, including aides to

HRC-2772



October 14, 2015


Page 2

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

President Clinton, and is also used primarily to store personal family files. We have conducted a review of the names and types of files in user-visible folders on the iMac and have found no emails from the relevant time period belonging to the former Secretary.

In the event that we become aware of any other equipment or devices that contain or contained any emails from the relevant time period to or from any @clintonemail.com domain account assigned to former Secretary Clinton, we will inform you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. E. Kendall".

David E. Kendall

DEK/bb

[REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)

b6

b7C

From: [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 3:06 PM
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (FBI); [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Consent Letter
Attachments: DOD - 10-7-15 letter.pdf

To file

b6 per FBI, NSD

b7C per FBI, NSD

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 07, 2015 6:42 PM
To: Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (USAVAE); [REDACTED] (USAVAE); [REDACTED] (NSD) (JMD)
Subject: FW: Consent Letter

FYI.

From: [REDACTED] b6 per NSD
Sent: Wednesday, October 07, 2015 6:35 PM b7C per NSD
To: [REDACTED] (NSD)
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Consent Letter

[REDACTED]

Attached please find a letter describing the parameters of our clients' consent to the FBI taking possession of personal electronic information.

Thanks very much,

b6
b7C

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
555 Eleventh Street, NW
Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
Direct Dial: [REDACTED]
Fax: +1 202 637 2201
Email: [REDACTED]
<http://www.lw.com>

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Latham & Watkins LLP



LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

555 Eleventh Street, N.W., Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
Tel: +1.202.637.2200 Fax: +1.202.637.2201
www.lw.com

b6
b7C

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London	Singapore
Los Angeles	Tokyo
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October 7, 2015

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL



United States Department of Justice
National Security Division
600 E Street Northwest
Washington, DC 20530

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Re: Grant of Limited Consent To Take Possession of Personal Electronic Information

Dear

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

On behalf of our clients, and we grant the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") limited consent to take possession of our clients' personal information stored on the PRN Server referenced in your letter dated October 4, 2015. Our clients also consent to the FBI conducting a forensic analysis on the PRN Server for the purpose of determining whether the PRN Server has been compromised. We also write to confirm the parameters of our clients' limited consent.

Our clients do not consent to any review or search of their personal information contained on the PRN Server, which includes but is not limited to email, calendar entries, contacts, text or BBM messages, and task lists. It is our understanding that the FBI must take possession of this personal information because the information cannot be removed from the PRN Server consistent with the FBI's need to determine whether the PRN Server has been subject to intrusion or otherwise compromised. We further understand that the FBI does not intend to review or search our clients' personal information contained on the PRN Server.


As discussed, our clients are particularly interested in minimizing the amount of time that the highly-personal information on the PRN Server is possessed by the FBI. Accordingly, we understand that the FBI will return or dispose of all of our clients' personal data, consistent with its policies and procedures, as soon as possible after the close of its investigation.

HRC-2775

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

Thank you for your consideration. Please contact me if you have any concerns about this limited consent or our clients' voluntary production of their personal information.

Sincerely yours,



b6
b7C

of **LATHAM & WATKINS LLP**

[REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)

b6
b7C

From: [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015, 3:07 PM
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: FW: W&C Letter (Executed)
Attachments: October 4, 2015 WC Letter (Executed).pdf

To clarify for all, I am sending all emails from DOJ containing letters to/from counsel for the file.

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2015 7:54 AM
To: Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (USAVAE); [REDACTED] (USAVAE); [REDACTED] (NSD) (JMD)
Subject: FW: W&C Letter (Executed)

b6 per FBI, NSD
b7C per FBI, NSD

Signed follow-on letter to W&C.

From: [REDACTED] (NSD)
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2015 7:39 AM
To: Kendall, David (DKendall@wc.com); kturner@wc.com
Cc: [REDACTED] (NSD); [REDACTED]
Subject: W&C Letter (Executed)

b6 per FBI, NSD
b7C per FBI, NSD

David and Katherine,

Attached is the signed follow-on letter to Williams & Connolly.

Best,

[REDACTED]

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

[REDACTED]
Counterintelligence and Export Control Section
National Security Division
U.S. Department of Justice

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Phone: [REDACTED]



U.S. Department of Justice
National Security Division

Washington, D.C. 20530

BY EMAIL

David E. Kendall, Esq.
Katherine M. Turner, Esq.
Williams & Connolly LLP
725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005

October 4, 2015

Dear Mr. Kendall and Ms. Turner,

This letter supplements the letter I previously sent to you today describing certain items — including the server administered by Platte River Networks (the “PRN Server”), equipment associated with the PRN Server (the “PRN Server Equipment”), and equipment associated with the “predecessor server” — that you have agreed to voluntarily produce to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). Consistent with your letter dated October 1, 2015, we have also agreed that you are providing consent to search, for evidence relevant to the FBI investigation of the matter referred by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, all of Secretary Clinton’s files dated from January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013 located on the PRN Server, PRN Server Equipment, and equipment associated with the “predecessor server.”

On July 30, 2015, the FBI delivered to PRN a letter requesting that it preserve records related to the @clintonemail.com account. We understand that PRN, through Williams & Connolly LLP, also received other requests to preserve records related to the @clintonemail.com account, including a July 29, 2015 preservation letter from Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman, United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; a May 26, 2015 preservation letter from Steve A. Linick, Inspector General, Department of State and I. Charles McCullough, III, Inspector General, Intelligence Community; and a March 3, 2015 preservation letter from Representative Trey Gowdy, Chairman, House of Representatives Select Committee on Benghazi. Once taking custody of the items referred to in today’s letters, the FBI will maintain them in an appropriately secure manner. We believe such maintenance satisfies any preservation obligations you and PRN may have.

HRC-2778

Finally, this letter confirms our understanding that any other equipment or devices not previously provided to the FBI, whether or not previously disclosed, that contain or contained any emails from the time period January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013 to or from any @clintonemail.com domain account assigned to Secretary Clinton, will be identified to us as soon as possible and no later than October 9, 2015.

Sincerely,



b6 per FBI, NSD
b7C per FBI, NSD

cc:



b6
b7C

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (RO) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 3:08 PM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (FBI); [redacted]
Subject: FW: Letter (Executed)
Attachments: October 4, 2015 Server Letter (Executed).pdf

To file

b6 per FBI, NSD
b7C per FBI, NSD

From: [redacted] (NSD) [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2015 7:53 AM
To: Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (RO) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (USAVAE); [redacted] (USAVAE); [redacted] (NSD) (JMD)
Subject: FW: Letter (Executed)

Signed letter to Latham and W&C.

From: [redacted] (NSD)
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2015 7:37 AM
To: Kendall, David (DKendall@wc.com); kturner@wc.com; [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Letter (Executed)

b6 per FBI, NSD
b7C per FBI, NSD

David, Katherine, and [redacted]

Attached is the signed letter concerning the voluntary production.

Best,

[redacted]

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

[redacted]
Counterintelligence and Export Control Section
National Security Division
U.S. Department of Justice

Phone: [redacted]



U.S. Department of Justice

National Security Division

Washington, D.C. 20530

BY EMAIL

David E. Kendall, Esq.
Katherine M. Turner, Esq.
Williams & Connolly LLP
725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005

[REDACTED]
Latham & Watkins LLP
555 Eleventh Street, N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20004

b6
b7C

October 4, 2015

Dear Mr. Kendall, Ms. Turner, and [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

This letter confirms your agreement to voluntarily produce to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") certain items described below that contain or contained emails to or from Secretary Clinton's @clintonemail.com accounts for the time period January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013.

First, you will voluntarily produce the server and related equipment which Platte River Networks ("PRN") set up in June 2013 (the "PRN Server" and "PRN Server Equipment," respectively). The PRN Server Equipment includes the following items: any onsite backup hardware, including but not limited to hardware purchased from Datto, Inc.; any remote backup content, including but not limited to content stored at Datto, Inc.; any firewall and firewall logs; any switches and traffic logs; and any intrusion detection system and logs.

The production of the PRN Server and PRN Server Equipment will occur in two stages (the "first stage" and "second stage," respectively), according to the procedures described herein. In the first stage, which is currently scheduled for October 3, 2015, the FBI will be provided access to the Equinix facility at 275 Hartz Way, Secaucus, New Jersey (the "Secaucus Facility"), which houses the PRN Server and PRN Server Equipment. While onsite at the Secaucus Facility, the FBI will collect data, including but not limited to memory, running processes, network connections, and virtual machines and their contents, from the PRN Server and PRN Server Equipment while they are running. FBI personnel will make every effort to ensure that there are no service disruptions on the PRN Server during the first stage acquisition.

The FBI will retain a full copy of all data collected in this "first stage," and will also provide a full copy of this data to be maintained in a secure space at the Litigation Security Group, Department of Justice, at 145 N Street NE, Washington, DC 20002. Properly cleared individuals who you identify will be able to

HRC-2781

access this image as necessary and appropriate to the representation of their clients, and the clients themselves, if properly cleared, may also obtain access to the image.

In the period between the first stage and the second stage, the FBI will begin, and attempt to complete, the extraction of specific email databases from the PRN Server, as further detailed below, in an appropriate forensic facility. In the second stage, which is currently scheduled to occur on or about October 9, 2015, persons identified by Williams & Connolly LLP will ensure onsite that the domains located on the PRN Server can send and receive email on a new server and associated equipment acquired by PRN (hereinafter the "New Server"). The FBI will at that time, or as soon as possible thereafter, provide historical email content from the PRN Server to persons that you identify. Finally, the FBI will shut down the PRN Server and any PRN Server Equipment that is running and collect the PRN Server and PRN Server Equipment.

As we have agreed, all historical email content residing on the PRN Server may be transferred to the New Server with the following exceptions:¹

1. For the accounts [redacted] and [redacted] only content dated prior to January 21, 2009, and from February 2, 2013 to the present, may be transferred to the New Server.²
2. For the email account [redacted] all email content may be transferred to the New Server with the exception of six (6) identified emails that may reside in the account. FBI technical personnel will identify these six (6) emails by the date and time of the messages. These personnel will not review any other content, and the FBI investigative team will have no access to the account. If present on the PRN server, the six (6) identified emails will be retained, but not searched, by the FBI.³
3. For the former Secretary's accounts on the @clintonemail.com domain, only content dated prior to January 21, 2009, and from February 2, 2013 to the present, may be transferred to the New Server.
4. For the account [redacted] only content dated prior to January 21, 2009, and from February 2, 2013 to the present, may be transferred to the New Server.

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

You are also providing consent for the FBI to conduct a forensic analysis, for purposes of identifying evidence relevant to its investigation of the matter referred by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, of the entire PRN Server and PRN Server Equipment. You are further providing consent to

¹ While there is no current basis to believe that any of the historical email content to be transferred to the New Server contains any classified information, if the FBI's continued investigation reveals that any of the historical email content transferred to the New Server potentially contains any classified information, we will take all necessary steps to appropriately address the situation.

² Although the historical content from the [redacted] and [redacted] accounts, subject to the date restrictions set forth above, may be eligible for migration to the New Server, counsel at Latham & Watkins LLP has requested that the historical content for these accounts, which are now inactive, be transferred to a hard drive or other portable media rather than to the New Server.

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

³ Counsel from Latham & Watkins LLP has advised that these six (6) emails from the [redacted] account may also be located in the [redacted] domain. For the email domain [redacted] all email content may be transferred to the New Server with the exception of these six (6) identified emails that may reside in the domain. FBI technical personnel will identify these six (6) emails by the date and time of the messages. These personnel will not review any other content, and the FBI investigative team will have no access to the [redacted] domain. If present on the PRN server in the [redacted] domain, the six (6) identified emails will be retained, but not searched, by the FBI.

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

search any unallocated space on the PRN Server and PRN Server Equipment for evidence within Secretary Clinton's files dated from January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013 that is relevant to the FBI investigation of the matter referred by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. Except as provided elsewhere, your consent does not extend to any other email content on the PRN Server and PRN Server Equipment.

Second, this letter also confirms your agreement to voluntarily produce to the FBI on October 3, 2015, all equipment associated with the "predecessor server" that was voluntarily produced to the FBI on August 12, 2015. The equipment associated with the "predecessor server" includes but is not limited to the following items, which are currently in PRN's possession in the Secaucus Facility: one (1) Cisco Network Attached Storage; one (1) Dell Blackberry server; and one (1) external USB hard drive. You are also providing consent for the FBI to conduct a forensic analysis, for purposes of identifying evidence relevant to its investigation of the matter referred by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, of the equipment associated with the "predecessor server."

At the conclusion of this investigation, all items voluntarily produced to the FBI will be returned to the owners or disposed of consistent with FBI policies and procedures.

Sincerely,



b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

cc: Miguel E. Rodriguez, Esq.;
Karen L. Dunn, Esq.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 3:09 PM
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (FBI); [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Kendall Consent Letter
Attachments: 2015.10.02 Letter to [REDACTED].PDF

From: [REDACTED] b6 per FBI, NSD
b7C per FBI, NSD
Sent: Friday, October 02, 2015 5:10 PM
To: Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (NSD) (JMD); [REDACTED] (USAVAE); [REDACTED] (USAVAE)
Subject: FW: Kendall Consent Letter

FYI. Consent for server equipment from predecessor server and for Datto backup.

From: Kendall, David [mailto:DKendall@wc.com]
Sent: Friday, October 02, 2015 3:54 PM
To: [REDACTED] (NSD)
Cc: [REDACTED] (NSD); Turner, Katherine; [REDACTED]
Subject: Kendall Consent Letter

b6 per FBI, NSD
b7C per FBI, NSD

Dear [REDACTED]

Attached please find one letter.

Sincerely,

David Kendall

David E. Kendall
Williams & Connolly LLP
725 Twelfth Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20005
(P) 202-434-5145 | (F) 202-434-5029
dkendall@wc.com | www.wc.com/dkendall

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LAW OFFICES
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP

725 TWELFTH STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005-5901

(202) 434-5000

FAX (202) 434-5029

DAVID E. KENDALL

(202) 434-5145

dkendall@wc.com

EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS (1920-1988)
PAUL R. CONNOLLY (1922-1978)

October 2, 2015

VIA E-MAIL AND FIRST CLASS MAIL

[REDACTED]
United States Department of Justice
National Security Division
600 E Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20530

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Dear [REDACTED]


Pursuant to our recent conversations, this letter provides the Department of Justice with consent to search any of former Secretary Clinton's files on the server equipment Platte River Networks stored in 2013 at the Equinix data center, Secaucus, NJ, for the period January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013 for evidence relevant to your security inquiry.

This letter also provides the Department of Justice with consent to search the back-up files of Datto Inc. for the current Platte River server for any file of former Secretary Clinton for the period January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013 for evidence relevant to your security inquiry.

I incorporate by reference the list of privilege trigger individuals set out in my letter to you dated October 1, 2015.

We request and anticipate that at the conclusion of your inquiry you will return to us the former Secretary's non-federal record, personal e-mails.

Sincerely,



David E. Kendall

DEK/csl

HRC-2785

[REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)

b6
b7C

From: [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 3:09 PM
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF)
(FBI)
Subject: FW: Correspondence from W&C
Attachments: Letter to [REDACTED]-Consent.pdf

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 01, 2015 12:11 PM
To: Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (NSD) (JMD); [REDACTED] (USAVAE); [REDACTED] (USAVAE)
Subject: Correspondence from W&C

b6 per FBI, NSD
b7C per FBI, NSD

All:

Attached is a letter that just came in from W&C. [REDACTED] and I will still need to send a letter to Latham & Watkins and W&C memorializing the process to be used with server (in two stages, etc.). We are working on revising that and will circulate to the group. When we send drafts, please review as quickly as possible and get back to us, as we are trying to keep things moving.

Thanks

[REDACTED]
Counterintelligence and Export Control Section
National Security Division
U.S. Department of Justice

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Phone: [REDACTED]

LAW OFFICES
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
725 TWELFTH STREET, N.W.

DAVID E. KENDALL
(202) 434-5145
dkendall@wc.com

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005-5901
(202) 434-5000
FAX (202) 434-5029

EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS (1920-1988)
PAUL R. CONNOLLY (1922-1978)

October 1, 2015

BY EMAIL AND FIRST CLASS MAIL

[REDACTED]
United States Department of Justice
National Security Division
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530


b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Dear [REDACTED]

Pursuant to our recent conversations, this letter provides the Department of Justice with consent to search former Secretary Clinton's files on the current Platte River server for the period January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013 for evidence relevant to your security inquiry.

We request and anticipate that at the conclusion of your inquiry you will return to us the former Secretary's non-federal record, personal e-mails.

Sincerely,



David E. Kendall

DEK/bb

HRC-2787

[REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)

b6
b7c

From: [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 3:10 PM
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: FW: Letters from David Kendall
Attachments: 2015.09.25 Letter from D. Kendall to [REDACTED] re Privilege.pdf; ATT00001.htm; 2015.09.25 Letter from D. Kendall to [REDACTED] re Consent.pdf; ATT00002.htm

-----Original Message-----

b6 per FBI, NSD
b7c per FBI, NSD

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, September 25, 2015 8:40 PM
To: [REDACTED] (USAVAE); [REDACTED] (USAVAE); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (NSD) (JMD)
Subject: Fwd: Letters from David Kendall

Letters from W&C re: filter search terms and consent for blackberry back-ups.

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Turner, Katherine" <KTurner@wc.com<mailto:KTurner@wc.com>>
Date: September 25, 2015 at 6:21:50 PM EDT
To: [REDACTED] (NSD) (JMD)"

b6 per NSD
b7c per NSD

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (NSD) (JMD)"
[REDACTED], "Kendall, David"
<DKendall@wc.com<mailto:DKendall@wc.com>>
Subject: Letters from David Kendall

Attached please find two letters from David Kendall. Thank you.

Katherine Turner
Williams & Connolly LLP
725 Twelfth Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20005
(P) 202-434-5487 | (F) 202-434-5029
kturner@wc.com<mailto:kturner@wc.com> | www.wc.com/kturner<http://www.wc.com/kturner>

This message and any attachments are intended only for the addressee and may contain information that is privileged and confidential. If you have received this message in error, please do not read, use, copy, distribute, or disclose the contents of the message and any attachments. Instead, please delete the message and any attachments and notify the sender immediately. Thank you.

LAW OFFICES
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
725 TWELFTH STREET, N.W

DAVID E. KENDALL
(202) 434-5145
dkendall@wc.com

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005-5901
(202) 434-5000
FAX (202) 434-5029

EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS (1920-1988)
PAUL R. CONNOLLY (1922-1978)

September 25, 2015

BY E-MAIL

[REDACTED]
U.S. Department of Justice
National Security Division
905 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Dear [REDACTED]

I write regarding the Department of Justice's security inquiry in response to a referral from the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. Pursuant to our conversation, I understand that your security inquiry may involve review of Secretary Clinton's e-mails for evidence relevant to that inquiry. As discussed, her e-mails include materials covered by attorney-client, marital, or medical privileges. I provide the following list of individuals and entities with whom Secretary Clinton may have communicated in a privileged context.

Attorneys

[REDACTED]
David Kendall, Williams & Connolly LLP

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

[REDACTED]
Cheryl Mills (in her capacity as personal counsel on prior matters)

[REDACTED]
Katherine Turner, Williams & Connolly LLP

Doctors

[REDACTED]
b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

[Redacted]

September 25, 2015

Page 2

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

[Redacted]

Marital

President William Jefferson Clinton

Personal Aides to President Clinton/Conduits of Marital Communications

[Redacted]

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Personal

Relatives

[Redacted]

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Personal Financial Consultant

[Redacted]

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

We request and anticipate that at the conclusion of your inquiry you will return to us the former Secretary's non-federal record, personal e-mails.

Sincerely,

David E. Kendall

David E. Kendall

LAW OFFICES
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP

725 TWELFTH STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005-5901

(202) 434-5000

FAX (202) 434-5029

DAVID E. KENDALL
(202) 434-5145
dkendall@wc.com

EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS (1920-1988)
PAUL R. CONNOLLY (1922-1976)

September 25, 2015

BY E-MAIL

[REDACTED]
U.S. Department of Justice
National Security Division
905 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530

b6 per NSD
b7C per NSD

Dear [REDACTED]

Pursuant to our conversation yesterday, this letter will provide the Department of Justice consent to search the back-up files of former Secretary Clinton's e-mails for evidence relevant to your security inquiry involving those e-mails.

We request and anticipate that at the conclusion of your inquiry you will return to us the former Secretary's non-federal record, personal e-mails.

Sincerely,

David E. Kendall

David E. Kendall

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 4

Page 5 ~ Duplicate;

Page 6 ~ Duplicate;

Page 7 ~ Duplicate;

Page 8 ~ Duplicate;

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

1A44

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WFO

Serial # of Originating Document 127

Date Received 1/6/16

From

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

MIDYEAR

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

2 LHM'S SENT TO CIA FOR USE AT BETH

1A44

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Date: 4 January 2016

To: [redacted]
Counterespionage Group
Counterintelligence Center CIA

b3 per CIA
b6 per CIA
b7C per CIA

From: [redacted] 1/4/16
Acting Section Chief
Counterespionage Section

b6
b7C

Subject: Requests authority use CIA documents during interviews

(U//~~FOUO~~) In July 2015, the FBI received a Section 811 referral from the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community (ICIG) regarding the possible compromise of classified national security information. The potential compromise was identified when, as part of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and the ICIG reviewed electronic mail (email) communications from private email accounts previously used by a former Secretary of State during their tenure at DoS.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At the request of the FBI, as well DoS and the ICIG, the CIA has since conducted classification reviews of emails and documents related to this matter that were deemed to contain CIA equities.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Currently, the FBI plans to interview several individuals who originated, transmitted or received classified documents via an unclassified email system. During these interviews the FBI would like to show the interviewee, and if necessary their legal counsel, the relevant documents that they were a party to. Doing so will allow the FBI to pursue a logical line of questions regarding the circumstances in which the classified information was sent.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

HRC-2793

(U//~~FOUO~~) More specifically, the FBI currently plans to interview [REDACTED] and his legal counsel from Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, about an email that he authored on March 21, 2009 and sent from his personal email account to the former Secretary of State. During a recent classification review the CIA deemed that the email was classified at the time that it was sent, but is now considered UNCLASS/CIAIOU.

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI also anticipates that it may be necessary to interview [REDACTED] regarding this matter as he is directly referenced in the email by name.

b6
b7C


(U//~~FOUO~~) As such, the FBI respectfully requests Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) authority to show the attached document to [REDACTED] and their respective legal counsel during future interviews regarding this matter.

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Please direct all inquiries regarding this request to Special Agent [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Sincerely,



b6
b7C

Acting Section Chief
Counterespionage Section

00

1A45

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WF

Serial # of Originating Document

130

Date Received

1/7/2016

From

Department of State, OIG

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

By

FOA

(City and State)

b6
b7C

To Be Returned

☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given

☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☐ Original notes re interview of

faxed time and attendance records

1A45

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User:

U.S. Department of State
Report of Historical Data
Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013

Pay Period: 26
Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016

b6 per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN:

Org Code: 183000

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total
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Pay Period 2 of 2013

Original TA delivered in PP: 2/2013

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 1 of 2013

Original TA delivered in PP: 1/2013

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 27 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 27/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 26 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 26/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 25 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 25/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 24 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 24/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 23 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 23/2012

b6 per DOS

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User: [REDACTED]

U.S. Department of State
Report of Historical Data
Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013

Pay Period: 26
Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016

b6 per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN [REDACTED]

Org Code: 183000

Continued.

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total
[REDACTED]															

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 22 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 22/2012

b6 per DOS

Remarks: FEDERAL OFFICES ARE CLOSED TO THE PUBLIC

Pay Period 21 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 21/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 20 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 20/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 19 of 2012

Corrected TA delivered in PP: 20/2012

b6 per DOS

Original TA delivered in PP: 19/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 18 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 18/2012

b6 per DOS

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User: [REDACTED]

U.S. Department of State
Report of Historical Data
Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013

Pay Period: 26
Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016

b6 per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYANM

SSN: [REDACTED]

Org Code: 183000

Continued.

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total
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b6 per DOS

Pay Period 17 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 17/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 16 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 16/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 15 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 15/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 14 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 14/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 13 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 13/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 12 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 12/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 11 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 11/2012

b6 per DOS

Pay Period 10 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 10/2012

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User: [REDACTED]

U.S. Department of State
Report of Historical Data
Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013

Pay Period: 26
Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016

b6 Per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN: [REDACTED]

Org Code: 183000

Continued.

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total
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b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 9 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 9/2012

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 8 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 8/2012

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 7 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 7/2012

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 6 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 6/2012

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 5 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 5/2012

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 4 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 4/2012

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 3 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 3/2012

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 2 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 2/2012

b6 Per DOS

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User: [REDACTED]

U.S. Department of State
Report of Historical Data
Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013

Pay Period: 26
Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016

b6 Per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN: [REDACTED]

Org Code: 183000

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Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total
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b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 1 of 2012

Original TA delivered in PP: 1/2012

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 26 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 26/2011

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 25 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 25/2011

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 24 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 24/2011

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 23 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 23/2011

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 22 of 2011

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User [REDACTED]

U.S. Department of State
Report of Historical Data
Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013

Pay Period: 26
Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016

b6 Per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN [REDACTED]

Org Code: 183000

Continued.

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total
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Original TA delivered in PP: 22/2011

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 21 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 21/2011

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 20 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 20/2011

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 19 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 19/2011

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 18 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 18/2011

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 17 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 17/2011

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 16 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 16/2011

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User [REDACTED]

U.S. Department of State
Report of Historical Data
Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013

Pay Period: 26
Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016

b6 Per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN [REDACTED]

Org Code: 183000

Continued.

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total
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Pay Period 15 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 15/2011

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 14 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 14/2011

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 13 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 13/2011

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 12 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 12/2011

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 11 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 11/2011

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 10 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 10/2011

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 9 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 9/2011

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User: [REDACTED]

U.S. Department of State
Report of Historical Data
Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013

Pay Period: 26
Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016

b6 Per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN: [REDACTED]

Org Code: 183000

Continued.

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total
[REDACTED]															

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 8 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 8/2011

[REDACTED]															
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b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 7 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 7/2011

[REDACTED]															
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b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 6 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 6/2011

[REDACTED]															
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b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 5 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 5/2011

[REDACTED]															
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b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 4 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 4/2011

[REDACTED]															
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b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 3 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 3/2011

[REDACTED]															
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b6 Per DOS

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User: [REDACTED]

U.S. Department of State

Report of Historical Data

Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013

Pay Period: 26

Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016

b6 Per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN: [REDACTED]

Org Code: 183000

Continued.

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total
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b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 2 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 2/2011

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 1 of 2011

Original TA delivered in PP: 1/2011

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 26 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 26/2010

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 25 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 25/2010

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 24 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 24/2010

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 23 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 23/2010

b6 Per DOS

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User [REDACTED]

U.S. Department of State

Report of Historical Data

Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013

Pay Period: 26

Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016

b6 Per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN [REDACTED]

Org Code: 183000

Continued.

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total
[REDACTED]															

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 22 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 22/2010

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 21 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 21/2010

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 20 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 20/2010

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 19 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 19/2010

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 18 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 18/2010

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 17 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 17/2010

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 16 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 16/2010

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User: [REDACTED]

**U.S. Department of State
Report of Historical Data
Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013**

**Pay Period: 26
Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016**

b6 Per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN: [REDACTED]

Org Code: 183000

Continued.

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total
[REDACTED]															

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 15 of 2010*Original TA delivered in PP: 15/2010*

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 14 of 2010*Original TA delivered in PP: 14/2010*

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 13 of 2010*Original TA delivered in PP: 13/2010*

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 12 of 2010*Original TA delivered in PP: 12/2010*

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 11 of 2010*Original TA delivered in PP: 11/2010*

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 10 of 2010*Original TA delivered in PP: 10/2010*

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 9 of 2010*Original TA delivered in PP: 9/2010*

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User: [REDACTED]

U.S. Department of State

Report of Historical Data

Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013

Pay Period: 26

Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016

b6 Per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN: [REDACTED]

Org Code: 183000

Continued.

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total
[REDACTED]															

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 8 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 8/2010

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 7 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 7/2010

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 6 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 6/2010

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 5 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 5/2010

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 4 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 4/2010

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 3 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 3/2010

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 2 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 2/2010

[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User [REDACTED]

U.S. Department of State
Report of Historical Data
Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013

Pay Period: 26
Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016

b6 Per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN [REDACTED]

Org Code: 183000

Continued

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thur	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thur	Fri	Sat	Total
------	-----	-----	-----	-----	------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	------	-----	-----	-------

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 1 of 2010

Original TA delivered in PP: 1/2010

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 26 of 2009

Original TA delivered in PP: 26/2009

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 25 of 2009

Original TA delivered in PP: 25/2009

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 24 of 2009

Original TA delivered in PP: 24/2009

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 23 of 2009

Original TA delivered in PP: 23/2009

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 22 of 2009

Original TA delivered in PP: 22/2009

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 21 of 2009

Original TA delivered in PP: 21/2009

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User [REDACTED]

**U.S. Department of State
Report of Historical Data
Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013**

**Pay Period: 26
Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016**

b6 Per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN [REDACTED]

Org Code: 183000

Continued.

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total
[REDACTED]															

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 20 of 2009*Original TA delivered in PP: 20/2009*[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 19 of 2009*Original TA delivered in PP: 19/2009*[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 18 of 2009*Original TA delivered in PP: 18/2009*[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 17 of 2009*Original TA delivered in PP: 17/2009*[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 16 of 2009*Original TA delivered in PP: 16/2009*[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 15 of 2009*Original TA delivered in PP: 15/2009*[REDACTED]

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 14 of 2009*Original TA delivered in PP: 14/2009*

Jan 7, 2016

11:21 AM

User

U.S. Department of State
Report of Historical Data
Pay Period 9 of 2009 - Pay Period 2 of 2013

Pay Period: 26
Dec. 27, 2015 - Jan. 9, 2016

b6 Per DOS

Name: PAGLIANO, BRYAN M

SSN

Org Code: 183000

Continued.

Code	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thr	Fri	Sat	Total

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 13 of 2009

Original TA delivered in PP: 13/2009

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 12 of 2009

Original TA delivered in PP: 12/2009

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

b6 Per DOS

Pay Period 11 of 2009

Original TA delivered in PP: 11/2009

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

b6 Per DOS

*** END OF REPORT ***

1A46

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WFO

Serial # of Originating Document 140

Date Received 2/12/2016

From DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

MIDYSAZ EXAM

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

LETTER TO DOS FOR USE AUTHORITY.

1A46



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Date: 12 February 2016

To: Gregory B. Starr
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Diplomatic Security

From: Peter Strzok
Section Chief
Counterespionage Section

Subject: Requests authority use confidential and classified DoS documents during interviews

(U//~~FOUO~~) In July 2015, the FBI received a Section 811 referral from the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community (ICIG) regarding the possible compromise of classified national security information.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The potential compromise was identified when, as part of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and the ICIG reviewed electronic mail (email) communications from private email accounts previously used by a former Secretary of State during her tenure at DoS. An initial review of this material identified emails containing national security information later determined by the US Intelligence Community (USIC) to be classified up to the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information level.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Currently the FBI plans to interview several individuals who originated, transmitted or received classified emails or documents via an unclassified email system. During these interviews the FBI would like to show the interviewees, and if necessary their legal counsel, the relevant documents to which they were a party. Doing so will allow the FBI to pursue a logical line of questions regarding the circumstances in which the classified information was sent.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

~~This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.~~

HRC-2816

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) As such, the FBI respectfully requests DoS authority to show DoS emails and documents, as provided to the FBI during the course of this investigation, to those individuals that were involved in, or knowledgeable of, the respective email chains. Given the amount of time that has elapsed since the emails were sent, the FBI believes that it is necessary to show the actual email and any attachments to the interviewees in order to have a meaningful discussion regarding the context in which the email was sent.


(U//~~FOUO~~) Due to the evolving nature of this matter, it is not currently possible to identify all of the specific documents which may be relevant to future interviews. Furthermore, the often quick turnaround time between identifying and interviewing relevant parties makes it infeasible to request DoS approval for each specific document prior to a given interview. Therefore, blanket approval is requested to show any of the confidential or classified DoS emails or documents, as provided to the FBI in the course of this matter, to future interviewees as deemed necessary.

(U//~~FOUO~~) For each DoS email or document to be used during an interview, the FBI will only show the email or document to those individuals, and their legal counsel, necessary to further the investigation. Additionally, standard safeguarding procedures will be used to ensure the protection of the content and to prevent any unnecessary disclosures.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Please direct all inquiries regarding this request to Special Agent

b6
b7C

Sincerely,



Peter Strzok
Section Chief
Counterespionage Section

♦♦

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

HRC-2817

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, February 12, 2016 2:34 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: DoS LHM dated 02/12/2016 --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
Attachments: DOS LHM 12FEB16.pdf

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

SentinelCaseId: TRANSITORY RECORD

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
=====

TRANSITORY RECORD

Hi [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Please find an LHM attached requesting DoS approval to use DoS emails in upcoming interviews. We would like to expedite this request if possible. We are happy to meet in person next week if this matter needs to be discussed further.

Thank you and have a nice weekend.

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

- 1A

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WF

Serial # of Originating Document

147

Date Received

2-24-2016

From

CIA

[Redacted]

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b3 per CIA
b6 per CIA
b7C per CIA

(Address)

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Midyear Exam

Reference:

LHM for CIA requesting interview

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☐

Original notes re interview of

LHM for CIA requesting interview w/ M. Moreu.

HRC-2820

1A49



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Date: February 24, 2016

To: [REDACTED]
Counterespionage Group
Counterintelligence Center CIA

b3 per CIA
b6 per CIA
b7C per CIA

From: Peter P. Strzok
Section Chief
Counterespionage Section

Subject: Request for Interview

The FBI Washington Field Office (WFO) respectfully requests the CIA's assistance in contacting former CIA Deputy Director Michael J. Morell in regards to a request for an FBI interview. It should be expressed said interview is voluntary and pertains to a sensitive matter in which the FBI believes Mr. Morell may be of assistance.

If you have any questions regarding this request, please direct all inquiries to Special Agent [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "P. Strzok", is written over the word "Sincerely,".

Peter P. Strzok
Section Chief
Counterespionage Section

♦♦

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

HRC-2821

1A50

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

-1A

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WFO

Serial # of Originating Document

148

Date Received

2/24/16

From

CIA

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

MIDYAR EXAM

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☐ Original notes re interview of

UHM PROVIDED TO CIA on 2/24/16

1A50

HRC-2822

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Date: 23 February 2016

To: [REDACTED]
Counterespionage Group
Counterintelligence Center CIA

b3 per CIA
b6 per CIA
b7C per CIA

From: Peter Strzok *PS*
Section Chief
Counterespionage Section

Subject: Provides notice that the FBI plans to use documents possibly containing classified CIA equities in upcoming interviews

(U//~~FOUO~~) In July 2015, the FBI received a Section 811 referral from the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community (ICIG) regarding the possible compromise of classified national security information. The potential compromise was identified when, as part of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and the ICIG reviewed electronic mail (email) communications from private email accounts previously used by a former Secretary of State during her tenure at DoS.

(S) (U//~~FOUO~~) At the request of the FBI, as well as DoS and the ICIG, the CIA has conducted classification reviews of an initial set of emails related to this matter that were deemed to contain CIA equities. On January 5, 2016, the FBI requested CIA authority to use [REDACTED] specific emails containing CIA equities in upcoming interviews of individuals that were a party to the specific emails. [REDACTED] b1 per CIA b3 per CIA

(S) [REDACTED] In a letter to the FBI dated January 21, 2016, the CIA provided formal approval for the FBI to use the cited emails in interviews with the following stipulations:

- FBI must verify that the witness/counsel:
 - had the appropriate clearance contemporaneously with the sending/receipt of the email at issue;

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

HRC-2823

- o currently **has** the appropriate clearance when interviewed by the FBI; **or**
- o signs a Non-disclosure agreement at the time of the interview prior to being shown properly labeled CIA classified information.


(U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI has continued to identify and review emails relevant to the referenced investigation since submitting the use authority request to the CIA in January. At this time, the FBI has identified additional emails that may contain CIA equities, which range in classification levels from SECRET//NF to TOP SECRET//CODE WORD. This assessment is based on the fact that the newly identified emails contain subject matter that is similar to that of the previously classified emails, although there has not yet been a formal classification determination on the newly identified emails.

(U//~~FOUO~~) These newly identified emails have been deemed critical to upcoming interviews regarding the referenced investigation. Given the amount of time that has elapsed since these emails were first sent, the FBI believes that it is necessary to show the actual emails to the interviewees in order to have a meaningful discussion regarding the context in which the email was sent. While the FBI plans to formally submit these newly identified emails to the CIA for formal OCA review, time constraints make it infeasible to do such prior to the upcoming interviews. Therefore, the FBI plans to use the newly identified emails as necessary while adhering to the use stipulations provided in the CIA memorandum dated January 2, 2016.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Please direct all inquiries regarding this request to
Special Agent [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

b7c

Sincerely,



Peter Strzok
Section Chief
Counterespionage Section

♦♦

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WF

Serial # of Originating Document

182

Date Received

8-5-16

From

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned ☒ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☒ Yes

☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

1A57

Title:

Midyear Exam

Reference:

FD-597

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

FD-597 dated 8-5-16

HRC-2976

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for PropertyALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-06-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

Case ID: _____

On (date) 8-5-2016

item (s) listed below were:

- ☐ Collected/Seized
☐ Received From
☐ Returned To
☒ Released To

(Name) _____

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS(Street Address) Department of State(City) Washington, DCDescription of Item (s): 5 DVDs titled:"Final Production to U.S. Dept of State"① DISC 2; Dataset 4② DISC 3; Datasets 5-9③ DISC 4; Datasets 10-14④ DISC 5; Datasets 15-19⑤ DISC 6; Dataset 20b6
b7Cb6 per FBI, DOS
b7C per FBI, DOS

Received By: _____

Received From: _____

Printed Name/Title: _____

Printed Name/Title: _____

HRC-2977

#58

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11)

File Number

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WF

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received

8/31/2016

From

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

SA

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Title:

MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☐ Original notes re interview of

FD-597

Receipt for Property

HRC-2978

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property

Case ID: _____

On (date) 8/18/2016

item (s) listed below were:

- ☐ Collected/Seized
☐ Received From
☐ Returned To
☒ Released To

(Name) _____

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS(Street Address) U.S. Department of State(City) Washington, DCDescription of Item (s): 1 CDR labeled (U) Final Production to U.S. Dept. of State
Datasets 1-20 File Listings, (U) Lab Number: 150806250;
(U) DEHQ82; (U) August 16, 2016.

Nothing Further
8/19/2016

b6
b7Cb6 per FBI, DOS
b7C per FBI, DOS

Received By: _____

8/18/16

Received From: _____

Printed Name/Title: _____

DS Special
Assistant

Printed Name/Title: _____

Special Agent

HRC-2979

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

1415
PRESPRO

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WFO

Serial # of Originating Document

25

Date Received

10-16-2015

From

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

FBI Detachee to DSS

(Address)

Arlington, VA

(City and State)

By

To Be Returned

☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given

☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Title:

Midyear Exam

Reference:

Information Received from DCS/DSS

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☐

Original notes re interview of

1A18

Login Banner Wording - DSS/DCS

HRC-6089

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76318T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 12-15-2016

[REDACTED]
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 5:02 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Name Checks

b6 Per
b7C DOS

[REDACTED]
A search of the DS/DO/OSI IMS (classified) system resulted in hits on the following two individuals only.

b6 Per
b7C DOS

[REDACTED] - PR-2007-03802 (previously migrated into IMS from a former database, so there is limited information)
This data is an export from PRTS

PRTS CASE:

Case Number: 11148

Case Name: [REDACTED]

Case Type: MISCELLANEOUS (MISC)

Case Category: MISCELLANEOUS

DS Case Number: 01-MC10-122003-263-0220

Agency: US DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Open Date: 14-NOV-03

Close Date: 08-DEC-03

Agent: [REDACTED]

b6 Per
b7C DOS

Case Comment: [REDACTED]

b6 Per
b7C DOS

Current Country: KAZAKHSTAN

Reported Date: 08-DEC-03

User Last Update: DTG

Date Last Update: 08-DEC-0

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

HRC-6090

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per FBI
b3 Per FBI
b6 Per DOS
b7C Per DOS
b7E Per FBI

(S)

~~Sensitive~~
This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

Office of
Special
Investigations
Since this was
prior to 2007,
we just have:

Summary.
Can request
details ~~from~~
if we want it.
from archives.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 7:33 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Warning Banners

b6
b7C

Especially the highlighted portions:

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 5:20 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Warning Banners

b6 Per
b7C DOS

[REDACTED]

The Logon Banner wording is specified in the Department's Operating System Configuration Guides. The official guides are published by DS/SI/CS. The configuration guides are located at: <https://intranet.ds.state.sbu/DS/SI/CS/ESS/SCM/SCM%20Final%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx>. The newer guides are in XML format. All systems are required to have the logon banner settings.

If post or site is using Windows 7 on the workstation, look in the Win configuration document item 100 and 101. The Win 7 configuration document is at: https://cs.ds.state.gov/Sharepoint/config/FINAL%20-%20Win7_v2_1-xccdf.xml

You are accessing a U.S. Government information system, which includes (1) this computer, (2) this computer network, (3) all computers connected to this network, and (4) all devices and storage media attached to this network or to a computer on this network. This information system is provided for U.S. Government-authorized use only. Unauthorized or improper use of this system may result in disciplinary action, as well as civil and criminal penalties. By using this information system, you understand and consent to the following. You have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding any communications or data transiting or stored on this information system. At any time, and for any lawful government purpose, the government may monitor, intercept, and search and seize any communication or data transiting, or stored on this information system. Any communications or data transiting or stored on this information system may be disclosed or used for any lawful government purpose. Nothing herein consents to the search or seizure of a privately-owned computer or other privately owned communications device, or the contents thereof, that is in the system user's home.

100 CCE-8973-0

Interactive logon:
Message text for users
attempting to logon

101 CCE-8740-3

Interactive logon:
Message title for users Warning: For Official Use Only!
attempting to logon


The following FAM/FAH policies identify the requirement and also states the banner info.


12 FAM 642.4-3

12 FAH-10 H-112.7-1

Note that there may be some deviation between the FAM and FAH specified wording. This could be a result of when the policy was written and the legal input to the banner since 2008. You can reach out to CS for a more definitive answer. The configuration guide uses the banner published in the 12 FAH and is actually associated with a Federal policy/standard NIST SP 800-53 Security Control – Access Control 8.

If you have a government owned blackberry, you can take a picture of the OpenNet logon screen and send it to your OpenNet email for documenting the logon also. If you require more information, please let me know.



DS ISSO
CGB Branch Chief
DS/CTO/CGB
Office: 
Fax: (571) 345-2092

b6 Per
b7C DOS

Tell us how we are doing! If you would like to provide feedback regarding your level of satisfaction with the service DS/CTO has provided, please submit a statement to [CTO's Feedback System](#).

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

12 FAM 642.4-3 Pre-Logon Warning Message

(CT:DS-136; 07-16-2008)

System managers must ensure that users attempting to access a Department computer system or network are presented with a pre-logon warning message. The following warning message must be used:

"You are about to enter a Department of State computer system or network. Use by unauthorized persons, or for unauthorized personal business, is prohibited and may constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1030 and other Federal law, as well as applicable Department policies and procedures.

You have NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY while using this computer system or network. All data contained and/or activities performed herein may be monitored, intercepted, recorded, read, copied, or captured in any manner by authorized personnel. System management personnel or supervisors may give law enforcement officials or appropriate Department managers any potential evidence of crime, fraud, or employee misconduct found on this computer system or network, and employees may be subject to discipline for misuse. Furthermore, law enforcement officials may be authorized to access and collect evidence from this computer system or network, or from any portable devices that have been connected to this computer system or network, therefore:

USE OF THIS COMPUTER SYSTEM OR NETWORK BY ANY USER, AUTHORIZED OR UNAUTHORIZED, CONSTITUTES EXPRESS CONSENT TO THIS MONITORING.

IF YOU DO NOT CONSENT TO THIS MONITORING, OR IF YOU ARE NOT AN AUTHORIZED USER, PRESS CTRL/ALT/DELETE SIMULTANEOUSLY AND EXIT THIS SYSTEM.

IF YOU ARE AN AUTHORIZED USER AND CONSENT, PRESS OK (or RETURN, or ENTER) TO INDICATE YOU AGREE TO ALL THE CONDITIONS STATED HEREIN."

12 FAH-10 H-112.7-1 System Use Notification – Management Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

- a. The IT CCB must ensure that approved operating systems have the capability to display a system use notification banner prior to granting users access to the information systems [L,M,H].
- b. DS/SI/CS must ensure that DS Security Configuration guides configure the information systems to [L,M,H]:

- (1) Display to users the below pre-logon warning message before granting access to the information systems:

You are accessing a U.S. Government information system, which includes (i) this information system; (ii) this information system's network; (iii) all information systems connected to this network; and (iv) all devices and storage media attached to this network or to information systems on this network. This information system is provided for U. S. Government-authorized use only.

Unauthorized or improper use of this system may result in disciplinary action, as well as civil and criminal penalties.

By using this information system, you understand and consent to the following:

You have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding any communications or data transiting or stored on this information system. At any time, and for any lawful government purpose, the government may monitor, intercept, and search and seize any communication or data transiting or stored on this information system.

Any communications or data transiting or stored on this information system may be disclosed or used for any lawful government purpose.

Nothing herein consents to the search or seizure of a privately-owned information system or other privately owned communications devices, or the contents thereof that is in the system user's home.

[click button: "I AGREE"]

- (2) Retain the pre-logon warning message on the screen until the user acknowledges the usage conditions and takes explicit actions to log on to or further access the information system (e.g., clicks the "I AGREE" button).
- c. Application owners of systems accessible by the general public that require access via logon interfaces must [L,M,H]:

- (1) Display to users a system use information banner before granting further access, see banner example in 12 FAH-10 H-112.7-1b(1);
- (2) Display to users references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing consistent with privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities; and
- (3) Include in the notice given to public users, a description of authorized uses of the system.

12 FAH-10 H-112.7-2 System Use Notification - User Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

Before logging on, the user must acknowledge reading the pre-logon warning message and agree to the conditions stated by pressing "I AGREE" [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.7 System Use Notification (AC-8)

12 FAH-10 H-112.7-1 System Use Notification – Management Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

- a. The IT CCB must ensure that approved operating systems have the capability to display a system use notification banner prior to granting users access to the information systems [L,M,H].
- b. DS/SI/CS must ensure that DS Security Configuration guides configure the information systems to [L,M,H]:
 - (1) Display to users the below pre-logon warning message before granting access to the information systems:

You are accessing a U.S. Government information system, which includes (i) this information system; (ii) this information system's network; (iii) all information systems connected to this network; and (iv) all devices and storage media attached to this network or to information systems on this network. This information system is provided for U. S. Government-authorized use only.

Unauthorized or improper use of this system may result in disciplinary action, as well as civil and criminal penalties.

By using this information system, you understand and consent to the following:

You have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding any communications or data transiting or stored on this information system. At any time, and for any lawful government purpose, the government may monitor, intercept, and search and seize any communication or data transiting or stored on this information system.

Any communications or data transiting or stored on this information system may be disclosed or used for any lawful government purpose.

Nothing herein consents to the search or seizure of a privately-owned information system or other privately owned communications devices, or the contents thereof that is in the system user's home.

[click button: "I AGREE"]

- (2) Retain the pre-logon warning message on the screen until the user acknowledges the usage conditions and takes explicit actions to log on to or further access the information system (e.g., clicks the "I AGREE" button).

- c. Application owners of systems accessible by the general public that require access via logon interfaces must [L,M,H]:
 - (1) Display to users a system use information banner before granting further access, see banner example in 12 FAH-10 H-112.7-1b(1);
 - (2) Display to users references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing consistent with privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities; and
 - (3) Include in the notice given to public users, a description of authorized uses of the system.

12 FAH-10 H-112.7-2 System Use Notification - User Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

Before logging on, the user must acknowledge reading the pre-logon warning message and agree to the conditions stated by pressing "I AGREE" [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.8 Information Systems Use

12 FAH-10 H-112.8-1 Information Systems Use - Management Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

- a. Domestically, MED must approve all information systems used to process or store medically privileged information (Medical-SBU) protected under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a. MED must directly supervise and control these information systems [L,M,H].
- b. Abroad, the regional Medical Officer or Foreign Service health practitioner, in coordination with the ISSO, must ensure that all information systems used to process and store medically privileged information (Medical-SBU) protected under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, can only be accessed by individuals authorized by the regional medical officer or Foreign Service health practitioner in concurrence with the ISSO [L,M,H].
- c. U. S. citizen direct-hire medical supervisors [L,M,H]:
 - (1) Must direct subordinates to process medical information only on SBU medical information systems authorized for such processing;
 - (2) May direct subordinates not to process especially sensitive medical information on SBU medical information systems. System administrators and ISSOs have access to users' libraries/files in the course of their duties; and

- (3) At Critical Technical or HUMINT Threat Posts, must approve in writing and provide direct supervision of Locally Employed Staff (LE Staff) that require after-hours information systems account access.

d. U. S. citizen direct-hire supervisors [L,M,H]:

- (1) May direct subordinates not to process especially sensitive information on SBU information systems. System administrators and ISSOs have access to users' libraries/files in the course of their duties;
- (2) Must direct subordinates not to process SBU information on Department systems dedicated for non-sensitive processing (e.g., DINs); and
- (3) At Critical Technical or HUMINT Threat Posts, must approve in writing and provide direct supervision of LE Staff that require after-hours information systems account access.

e. Supervisors, in coordination with their ISSO, must inform their employees that they must use the most stringent access controls (e.g., use file access controls, use encryption, etc.) when processing information concerning an individual considered to be compromising, adverse, embarrassing, or derogatory. Access to such information should be limited to those with a need to know requirement. Users must be advised to store such information on the information systems for the minimum amount of time necessary [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.8-2 Information Systems Use - System Administrator Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The system administrator must [L,M,H]:

- (1) At Critical Technical or HUMINT Threat Posts, disable LE Staff information systems account access outside of normal post business hours. Only grant after-hours account access after receiving written approval from a cleared U. S. citizen supervisor; and maintain records of all after-hours approvals for a minimum of six months after after-hours access is no longer required. The records may need to be retained longer to meet regulatory (e.g., NARA) requirements and Department information retention requirements. After-hours access must be under the direct supervision of a cleared U.S. citizen supervisor;
- (2) Ensure that users process medical information only on SBU medical information systems authorized for such processing;
- (3) Ensure that all SBU information systems (e.g., OpenNet) are used only for processing SBU and non-sensitive unclassified

information. The processing of classified and SBU/NOFORN information is prohibited; and

- (4) Ensure that all non-sensitive unclassified information systems (e.g., DINs) are used only for processing non-sensitive unclassified information. The processing of classified, SBU and SBU/NOFORN information is prohibited.

12 FAH-10 H-112.8-3 Information Systems Use - ISSO Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The ISSO must [L,M,H]:

- (1) Abroad, in coordination with the regional Medical Officer or Foreign Service health practitioner, ensure that all information systems used to process and store medically privileged information (Medical-SBU) protected under the Privacy Act of 1974, can only be accessed by individuals authorized, in writing, by the regional Medical Officer or Foreign Service health practitioner;
- (2) Ensure that users process medical information only on SBU medical information systems authorized for such processing;
- (3) Ensure that all SBU information systems (e.g., OpenNet) are used only for processing SBU and non-sensitive unclassified information. Processing classified and SBU/NOFORN information is prohibited;
- (4) Ensure that all non-sensitive unclassified information systems (e.g., DINs) are used only for processing non-sensitive unclassified information. Processing classified, SBU, and SBU/NOFORN information is prohibited;
- (5) Instruct all information systems users that, when logged on, workstations are never to be left unattended by the user. All activity occurring when the workstation is logged-on is the responsibility of the user;
- (6) At Critical Technical or HUMINT Threat Posts, review records of all LE Staff after-hours approvals;
- (7) In coordination with the user's supervisor, inform employees that they must use the most stringent access controls (e.g., use file access controls, use encryption, etc.) when processing information concerning an individual considered to be compromising, adverse, embarrassing, or derogatory. Access to such information should be limited to those with a need to know requirement. Users must be

advised to store such information on the information systems for the minimum amount of time necessary.

12 FAH-10 H-112.8-4 Information Systems Use - User Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

Users must [L,M,H]:

- (1) Be aware that they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on Department information systems;
- (2) Only process SBU and non-sensitive unclassified information on Department SBU information systems (e.g., OpenNet). Processing classified and SBU/NOFORN information is prohibited;
- (3) Only process non-sensitive unclassified information on non-sensitive unclassified information systems (e.g., DINs). Processing classified, SBU, and SBU/NOFORN information is prohibited;
- (4) Use the most stringent access controls (e.g., use file access controls, use encryption, etc.) when processing information concerning an individual considered to be compromising, adverse, embarrassing, or derogatory. Access to such information should be limited to those with a need to know requirement. Users must store such information on the information systems for the minimum amount of time necessary;
- (5) Never leave their workstations unattended when logged on. All activity occurring when the workstation is logged-on is the responsibility of the user;
- (6) Logoff of the workstations at the end of their work day;
- (7) Use discretion when processing especially sensitive information on unclassified information systems. Users should bear in mind that system administrators and ISSOs have access to users' libraries/files in the course of their duties;
- (8) Process medical information only on SBU medical information systems authorized for such processing; and
- (9) For LE Staff at Critical Technical or HUMINT Threat Posts, receive prior written approval from a cleared U.S. citizen supervisor for after-hours information systems access.

12 FAH-10 H-112.9 Monitoring System User Activity

12 FAH-10 H-112.9-1 Monitoring System User Activity - Management Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

DS/SI/CS, in coordination with IRM/IA, may review e-mail exiting the Department to detect and prevent the unauthorized transmission of data [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.9-2 Monitoring System User Activity - ISSO Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The ISSO conducts monthly reviews of randomly selected user accounts to ensure that users are [L,M,H]:

- (1) Adequately protecting sensitive information;
- (2) Not processing classified or SBU/NOFORN information;
- (3) Not installing or using unauthorized software; and
- (4) Not installing, connecting or using unauthorized hardware.

12 FAH-10 H-112.10 Concurrent Session Control - Management Responsibilities (AC-10)

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

- a. The IT CCB must ensure that approved operating systems have the capability to limit the number of concurrent sessions for the same user account [L,M,H].
- b. DS/SI/CS must ensure that DS Security Configuration Standards configure the information systems to limit the number of concurrent sessions for the same user account to a maximum of one [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.11 Session Lock (AC-11)

12 FAH-10 H-112.11-1 Session Lock – Management Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

- a. The IT CCB must ensure that approved operating systems have the capability to [L,M,H]:

- (1) Automatically activate a password-protected screen saver on a logged-on workstation; and
 - (2) Allow users to lock the workstation manually.
- b. DS/SI/CS must ensure that DS Security Configuration Standards configure the information systems to [L,M,H]:
- (1) Automatically activate a password-protected screen saver on a logged-on workstation after fifteen minutes of inactivity;
 - (2) Retain the session lock until the user logs back in; and
 - (3) Allow users to lock the workstation manually.

12 FAH-10 H-112.11-2 Session Lock - User Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

Users must [L,M,H]:

- (1) Initiate session lock by activating the password-protected screen saver, before leaving their workstation (e.g., press CNTRL +ALT +DEL keys then select "Lock this Computer"; or press Windows Flag key +L); (see 12 FAH-10 H-112.22-3 for thin client locking procedures) and
- (2) Not substitute a session lock for logging out of the information systems. Users must log out of the information systems at the end of each work day.

12 FAH-10 H-112.12 Session Termination – Management Responsibilities (AC-12)

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

- a. The IT CCB must ensure that approved operating systems have the capability to terminate user-initiated logical sessions after a Department approved time period [M,H].
- b. DS/SI/CS must ensure that DS Security Configuration Standards configure the information systems to terminate a logical user session after a Department approved time period [M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.13 Permitted Actions Without Identification and Authentication - Management Responsibilities (AC-14)

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

DS/SI/CS must ensure that DS Security Configuration Standards configure the information systems to require identification and authentication before granting access to the information systems [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.14 Installation of Non-Department-Owned Information Systems within Department Facilities (AC-20)

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

- a. For the purpose of this section, "dedicated office space" means that the non-Department entity is responsible for controlling access to their leased space and does not share it with a Department office, and there is no Department information systems equipment in the space except as may have been approved in writing by DS/SI/CS and IRM/IA [L,M,H].
- b. For the purpose of this section, "installation" refers to the non-Department information systems remaining in a Department facility for an approved amount of time, at a minimum overnight [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.14-1 Installation of Non-Department-Owned Information Systems within Department Facilities - Management Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

- a. Abroad, the RSO must approve the installation of non-Department owned information systems for: visitor presentations; on-site support of mission operations; and contractor maintenance. Installation must be in accordance with requirements specified in 12 FAH-6 H-542.5-4, paragraphs (a), (e), and (f), respectively, of the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) Unclassified Automated Information Systems Standard and 12 FAH-10 H-150, Wireless Access [L,M,H].
- b. Domestically and abroad, non-Department entities (e.g., credit unions, tenant agencies) housed in Department facilities may install and/or use non-Department owned information systems in dedicated office space. The entity must comply with 12 FAH-10 H-150, Wireless Access, and any applicable guidance promulgated by Countermeasures Program Division (DS/ST/CMP) [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.14-2 Installation of Non-Department-Owned Information Systems within Department Facilities - System Administrator Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The system administrator must ensure that non-Department owned information systems are not installed in a Department facility without written approval from DS/SI/CS and IRM/IA, except if the non-Department entity has approved dedicated office space (e.g., credit union, tenant agency) [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.14-3 Installation of Non-Department-Owned Information Systems within Department Facilities - ISSO Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The ISSO must ensure that non-Department owned information systems are not installed in a Department facility without written approval from DS/SI/CS and IRM/IA, except if the non-Department entity has approved dedicated office space (e.g., credit union, tenant agency) [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.14-4 Installation of Non-Department-Owned Information Systems within Department Facilities - User Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

Users must not install non-Department owned information systems in a Department facility (e.g., do not leave a personally-owned laptop in a Department facility overnight) without written approval from DS/SI/CS and IRM/IA [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.15 Department Stand-Alone Desktop Information Systems connected to Non-Department Systems (AC-20)

12 FAH-10 H-112.15-1 Department Stand-Alone Desktop Information Systems connected to Non-Department Systems - System Administrator Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The system administrator must ensure that Department stand-alone desktops authorized to connect to non-Department systems (e.g., Internet) are never simultaneously attached to a Department information system except through the use of a Department approved remote access program (e.g., Global OpenNet (GO)). Such desktops must be reimaged prior to any subsequent direct connectivity to a Department information system [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.15-2 Department Stand-Alone Desktop Information Systems connected to Non-Department Systems - ISSO Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The ISSO must ensure that Department stand-alone desktops authorized to connect to non-Department systems (e.g., Internet) are never simultaneously attached to a Department information system except through the use of a Department approved remote access program (e.g., GO). Such desktops must be reimaged prior to any subsequent direct connectivity to a Department information system [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.15-3 Department Stand-Alone Desktop Information Systems connected to Non-Department Systems – User Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

Users must ensure that Department stand-alone desktops authorized to connect to non-Department systems (e.g., Internet) are never simultaneously attached to a Department information system except through the use of a Department approved remote access program (e.g., GO). Such desktops must be reimaged by the system administrator prior to any subsequent direct connectivity to a Department information system [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.16 Department Information Systems Installed in Official Residences (AC-20)

12 FAH-10 H-112.16-1 Department Information Systems Installed in Official Residences - Management Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

- a. DS/SI/CS and IRM/IA must approve the installation of Department-owned information systems in official residences. Requesting posts and bureaus must demonstrate a compelling operational requirement for the connection [L,M,H].
- b. Abroad, requests must be submitted via the DS/SI/CS and IRM/IA Web Portal.
- c. Domestically, the Bureau Executive Director must send all connectivity requests via official memo to DS/SI/CS and IRM/IA [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.16-2 Department Information Systems Installed in Official Residences - System Administrator Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The system administrator must ensure that Department-owned information systems are not installed in official residences without DS/SI/CS and IRM/IA written approval [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.16-3 Department Information Systems Installed in Official Residences - ISSO Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The ISSO must ensure that Department-owned information systems are not installed in official residences without DS/SI/CS and IRM/IA written approval [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.17 Information Systems Interconnections/Extensions (AC-20)

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

See 12 FAH-10 H-312.2.

12 FAH-10 H-112.18 Unclassified Stand-Alone Facsimile (Fax) Equipment

12 FAH-10 H-112.18-1 Unclassified Stand-Alone Facsimile (Fax) Equipment - Management Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

- a. In accordance with 12 FAM 553, the RSO/post security officer (PSO) or principal unit security officer (PUSO)/bureau security officer (BSO) must report the transmission of classified material over unclassified fax equipment as a security incident [L,M,H].
- b. The general services officer (GSO) must securely procure fax equipment for use in the controlled access area (CAA), from U.S. vendors located in the United States. DS/CMP/TSC and IRM/OPS/ITI/LWS/FTP approval is required prior to procurement [L,M,H].
- c. For fax machines located inside a CAA the IMO, in coordination with the ISSO, must ensure the separation requirements addressed in 12 FAH-6, OSPB Security Standards and Policy Handbook, are met [L,M,H].
- d. Abroad, the RSO/PSO or PUSO must ensure that, at a minimum, Secret-cleared U.S. citizen personnel install and repair fax equipment within the CAA [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.18-2 Unclassified Stand-Alone Facsimile (Fax) Equipment - System Administrator Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

- a. The system administrator must [L,M,H]:
 - (1) Report the transmission of classified material over unclassified fax equipment to the ISSO, RSO/PSO or PUSO/BSO; and
 - (2) Refer to 12 FAH-10 H-262.5 "Media Sanitization" for requirements on disposal of non-volatile media.
- b. Abroad inside the CAA, the cleared U.S. citizen system administrator must locate stand-alone fax equipment in dedicated unclassified space (DUS) and it must be isolated in accordance with Telephone Security Group (TSG) standards (e.g., fiber and/or private branch exchange (PBX)/computerized telephone system (CTS) isolation in accordance with Post threat level requirements) [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.18-3 Unclassified Stand-Alone Facsimile (Fax) Equipment - ISSO Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The ISSO must [L,M,H]:

- (1) Assist the RSO/PSO or PUSO/BSO with suspected security incident investigations;

- (2) Ensure all unclassified fax equipment is clearly labeled, "UP TO UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION MAY BE PROCESSED ON THIS SYSTEM";
- (3) In accordance with 12 FAM 553, report the transmission of classified material over unclassified fax equipment as a security incident;
- (4) For fax equipment located inside a CAA, in coordination with the IMO, ensure the separation requirements addressed in 12 FAH-6, Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) Security Standards and Policy Handbook, are met; and
- (5) Abroad, ensure that, at a minimum, Secret-cleared U.S. citizen personnel install and repair fax equipment within the CAA.

12 FAH-10 H-112.18-4 Unclassified Stand-Alone Facsimile (Fax) Equipment - User Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

Users must [L,M,H]:

- (1) Ensure that no classified information is processed on unclassified fax equipment;
- (2) Be aware that fax equipment uses unsecure commercial telephone lines to process and transmit unclassified data and these lines are vulnerable to covert monitoring;
- (3) Refer to 12 FAM 540 for requirements on sending SBU faxes; and
- (4) Immediately notify domestically, DS/CIRT, and abroad, the ISSO or RSO if they discover or suspect unauthorized disclosure of information or unauthorized transmission of data. Report unauthorized fax use to the ISSO, RSO/PSO or PUSO/BSO.

12 FAH-10 H-112.19 Facsimile (Fax) Gateways/Servers

12 FAH-10 H-112.19-1 Facsimile (Fax) Gateways/Servers - Management Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

Bureaus/Posts [L,M,H]:

- a. Must only use IT CCB or local CCB approved fax gateway/server equipment; and
- b. That require data networked fax services (Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP)) must submit an official memo/cable request to DS/SI/CS and IRM/IA for approval.

12 FAH-10 H-112.19-2 Facsimile (Fax) Gateways/Servers - System Administrator Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The system administrator must [L,M,H]:

- a. Ensure fax gateways and/or fax servers configurations only allow outbound faxes and disable all inbound fax services;
- b. Configure fax gateways/servers to:
 - (1) Prohibit remote management, maintenance or configuration;
 - (2) Prohibit transmission control protocol/Internet protocol (TCP/IP) services;
 - (3) Prohibit inbound faxes;
 - (4) Prohibit the use of multi-network connectivity (i.e., the fax gateway and/or fax server must only connect to a single local area network (LAN); and
 - (5) Set the auto answer feature to off.
- c. Ensure that fax gateways/servers only use dial-up connections;
- d. Configure analog phone lines and/or computerized telephone system (CTS) so that:
 - (1) All fax gateway/server extension lines only transit through the Department's CTS;
 - (2) All fax gateway/server extension lines are outgoing trunks only on separate outgoing trunk groups. The outgoing trunk must not have any voice extensions; and
 - (3) Incoming calls are prohibited.
- e. Ensure that fax gateway/server equipment used within the CAA is TSG-approved or connects to a TSG-approved disconnect device;
- f. Ensure that fax gateways and fax servers also meet existing telephone security, TEMPEST and information systems security standards; and
- g. Refer to 12 FAH-10 H-262.5 "Media Sanitization" for requirements on disposal of non-volatile media.

12 FAH-10 H-112.19-3 Facsimile (Fax) Gateways/Servers - User Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

Users [L,M,H]:

- (1) Must ensure that no classified information is processed on fax gateway/server equipment;

- (2) Must be aware that fax gateway/server equipment use unsecure commercial telephone lines to process and transmit data and these lines are vulnerable to covert monitoring;
- (3) Discovering or suspecting unauthorized disclosure of information, unauthorized transmission of data, or unauthorized fax use must immediately report such incidents to the ISSO, RSO/PSO or PUSO/BSO; and
- (4) Must refer to 12 FAM 540 for requirements on sending SBU faxes.

12 FAH-10 H-112.20 Information Sharing - Management Responsibilities (AC-21)

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

Information systems owners must [M,H]:

- (1) Facilitate sharing of restricted information (e.g., privileged medical information, contract sensitive information, proprietary information) by enabling authorized users to determine whether access authorizations assigned to the sharing partner (e.g., individual, group, office) match the access restrictions on the information; and
- (2) Employ automated mechanisms or manual processes to assist users in making information sharing/collaboration decisions.

12 FAH-10 H-112.21 Publicly Accessible Content - (AC-22)

12 FAH-10 H-112.21-1 Publicly Accessible Content - Management Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

Bureaus/Posts must [L,M,H]:

- (1) Designate individuals authorized to post information onto a publicly accessible Department information system;
- (2) Train authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain Department sensitive information;
- (3) Review proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible Department information systems to ensure that Department sensitive information is not included;

- (4) Review the content on the publicly accessible information systems for Department sensitive information at least monthly and remove, if discovered; and
- (5) See 5 FAM 790, Using Social Media, for more information.

12 FAH-10 H-112.21-2 Publicly Accessible Content - User Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

Users must [L,M,H]:

- (1) Not post Department sensitive information onto a Department information system that is publicly accessible;
- (2) Be trained to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain Department sensitive information; and
- (3) See 5 FAM 790, Using Social Media, for more information.

12 FAH-10 H-112.22 Thin Clients

12 FAH-10 H-112.22-1 Thin Clients - Management Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

- a. The IT CCB must approve all thin-clients for use on Department SBU and non-sensitive unclassified information systems [L,M,H].
- b. Special Security Operations Division (DS/IS/SSO) approves the use of thin clients in sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs) [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.22-2 Thin Clients - System Administrator Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The system administrator must ensure that thin clients [L,M,H]:

- (1) Used on Department SBU and non-sensitive unclassified information systems are Department-owned and IT CCB approved;
- (2) Are configured in accordance with the Global Information Technology Modernization (GITM) Post Thin Client Admin Guide located on the GITM Web Site; and
- (3) Abroad, disposal complies with 12 FAH-6 H-542.5-10, Unclassified Automated Information Systems (UAIS).

12 FAH-10 H-112.22-3 Thin Clients – User Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

Users must [L,M,H]:

- (1) Log off the thin client at close of business (COB) each day. Users must use the "Logoff Terminal Server" icon on the desktop screen to logoff the workstation;
- (2) Lock their thin clients when they are away from the workstation.
- (3) Use the "LOCK WORKSTATION" icon on the desktop screen to lock the workstation; and
- (4) Not use CTRL+ALT+DEL; because of the thin client's configuration, users may need to power off and restart to log on.

12 FAH-10 H-112.23 Unclassified Video Teleconferencing (UVTC)

12 FAH-10 H-112.23-1 UVTC - Management Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

a. The Office Director, domestically, and the RSO and IMO, abroad, must ensure [L,M,H]:

- (1) Registration of the UVTC, if it is to be connected to the unclassified enterprise network (e.g., OpenNet);
- (2) Notification of the Video Program Office (IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/DTS) before connecting any equipment to the unclassified enterprise network (e.g., OpenNet); and
- (3) Abroad, inside the CAA, written approval by post's counterintelligence working group (CIWG) and the Countermeasures Program Division (DS/ST/CMP).

b. The IT CCB must approve all UVTC hardware and software [L,M,H].

c. The Special Security Operations Division (DS/IS/SSO) must approve use of a UVTC within Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.23-2 UVTC – System Administrator Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The system administrator must ensure [L,M,H]:

- (1) Use of only Department-owned and IT CCB-approved UVTC hardware and software (contact the Video Program Office before ordering equipment for the unclassified enterprise network (e.g., OpenNet));
- (2) Configuration of UVTC equipment is in accordance with the Department's Video Teleconference Security Configuration Standard, e.g., all auto answering and far end remote control features are disabled;
- (3) For the unclassified enterprise network (e.g., OpenNet), UVTC equipment licensing and accessibility for management is done by the Video Program Office;
- (4) For unclassified non-enterprise networks, UVTC equipment licensing and accessibility for management is done by the system owner;
- (5) Up-to-date maintenance contracts for all unclassified UVTC equipment to ensure that end points on the network have the proper firmware and configuration; and
- (6) The Special Security Operations Division (DS/IS/SSO) has approved the use of the UVTC prior to use within Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs).

12 FAH-10 H-112.23-3 UVTC – ISSO Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

The ISSO must ensure UVTC operators receive a copy of the UVTC Cybersecurity Awareness briefing, which advises the potential risks of using UVTC. See the Cybersecurity Awareness Web site for the latest briefing [L,M,H].

12 FAH-10 H-112.23-4 UVTC – User Responsibilities

(CT:DS-002; 09-19-2014)

When using the UVTC equipment, the user must [L,M,H]:

- (1) Face the UVTC camera away from any classified information, any unrelated SBU information and PII, and any areas outside the UVTC space;
- (2) When required, use only IT CCB approved noise-cancelling headsets;
- (3) Never leave active UVTC sessions unattended;
- (4) Log off when the UVTC session is completed;
- (5) Turn off the UVTC equipment (e.g., camera and microphones) and cover the camera lens when not in use; and

- (6) Abroad, inside the CAA, the RSO or PSO and ISSO must ensure UVTC equipment is installed in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-542.5-5.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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FOI/PA# 1353814-0

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#21

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

PRESPO

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WFE

Serial # of Originating Document

29

Date Received

10-29-15

From

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

DSL DOS

(Address)

Arlington, Va

(City and State)

By

To Be Returned

☐ Yes☒ No

Receipt Given

☐ Yes☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes☒ No

Title:

Midyear Exam

Reference:

Production Response
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☐ Original notes re interview of

1 Copy of 12-4-15 email titled TIC w Mark Kosa

CD titled [redacted] FBI Request memo

Oct 6, 2015 Clinton Email "

HRC-6383

1A21

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number [REDACTED] PRESPRO

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WF

Serial # of Originating Document 29

Date Received 10-29-15

From [REDACTED]
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b6 Per
b7C DOS

DS / DoS
(Address)

Arlington, VA
(City and State)

By [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (c)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title:

Midyear Exam

Reference: [REDACTED] Production Response
(Communication Enclosing Material)

b6
b7C

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

1 copy of 12-4-10 email titled TIC w Musa Kusan

CD titled "[REDACTED] FBI Request memo

b6
b7C

Oct 6, 2015 Clinton email."

HRC-6384

From: Feltman, Jeffrey D
Sent: Saturday, December 04, 2010 10:14 PM
To: Sanderson, Janet A; Schlicher, Ronald L; Cretz, Gene A; [REDACTED] b6
[REDACTED] Kalmbach, Heather E; Polaschik, Joan A [REDACTED] b7C
Subject: Fw: T/C w Musa Kusa

FYI. I had told S that, if it's bad, she might want to offer to bring Gene back. I'll ask her on Monday, or before if she calls, what happened.

Jeffrey Feltman

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Burns, William J; Feltman, Jeffrey D; Kennedy, Patrick F
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Sat Dec 04 13:53:21 2010
Subject: T/C w Musa Kusa

You will read in the memcon that Musa Kusa asked me that Bill come to Tripoli to discuss the US-Libya relationship and that Pat come to discuss embassy issues. I also, as per Jeff's suggestion, said I was asking Amb Cretz to come back to DC for consultations. Let's discuss how we follow up Monday.

②

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Total Deleted Page(s) = 75


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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U//~~FOUO~~) Damaged CD In [REDACTED]
CYBER-1A27

Date: 02/12/2019

b3
b7E

From: WASHINGTON FIELD
WF-CI13

Contact: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Approved By: A/SSA [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED] (U) RESTRICTED - Access Denied

b3
b7E

Synopsis: (U//~~FOUO~~) To document a damaged compact disk (CD) located in [REDACTED] CYBER-1A27.

~~Reason: 1.4(c)
Derived From: FBI NSIC
dated 20120629
Declassify On: 20441231~~

Reference: [REDACTED] Serial 37

b3
b7E

Details:

(U//~~FOUO~~) For reference, Special Agents (SAs) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] have been gathering and copying materials from the captioned case located in the Washington Field Office (WFO) CI-13 Workbox in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) tasking from Information Management Division (IMD; formerly known as Records Management Division).

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) On or about February 6, 2019, SAs [REDACTED] [REDACTED] opened [REDACTED] CYBER-1A27, which contained a CD with a crack on it (a damaged CD). SA [REDACTED] attempted to copy the damaged CD at the WFO Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) self-service area, but was not able to do so. SA [REDACTED] spoke with FBI information technology

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U//~~FOUO~~) Damaged CD In [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED] 02/12/2019


b3
b7E

specialists on the ground floor of WFO regarding the damaged CD, who indicated it was unlikely the CD could be copied.

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U//~~FOUO~~) Missing Item - [REDACTED]
1A4

Date: 02/12/2019

b3
b7E

From: WASHINGTON FIELD

WF-CI13

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: A/SSA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

(U) RESTRICTED - Access Denied

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Synopsis: (U//~~FOUO~~) To document missing item [REDACTED] 1A4,
which is described as "Notes from Meeting" acquired by [REDACTED]

~~Reason: 1.4(c)~~

~~Derived From: Multiple
Sources~~

~~Declassify On: 20441231~~

Reference: [REDACTED] Serial 44

b3
b7E

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Email

Details:

(U//~~FOUO~~) For reference, Washington Field Office (WFO) CI-13 has been gathering and copying materials from captioned case in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) tasking from Information Management Division (IMD; formerly Records Management Division).

(U//~~FOUO~~) On or about February 4, 2019, Special Agents (SAs) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] attempted to locate [REDACTED] 1A4,
described as "Notes from Meeting" acquired by [REDACTED] (see
referenced serial). The SAs looked through all case materials in the

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED]

Item - [REDACTED] 1A4
2019

b3
b7E

CI-13 file and workbox area, however, they were not able to locate this item.

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA [REDACTED] inquired with Supervisory Intelligence Analyst (SIA) [REDACTED] regarding the item, as he was previously the IA assigned to the case. SIA [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] [REDACTED] regarding the item, who indicated he remembered handing over his notes to SA [REDACTED] (see attached email).

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) On February 6, 2019, SA [REDACTED] contacted SA [REDACTED] regarding the notes. SA [REDACTED] explained he documented all relevant case materials before leaving the case and did not retain any notes or other case materials.

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) As such, WFO CI-13 considers the item missing and will enclose this document into 1A4 as a placeholder until the missing item is located.

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

From: [redacted] (OCIO) (FBI)
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: RE: MYE Serial #?? --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
Date: Tuesday, February 05, 2019 10:43:14 AM

b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: C82W53B30~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSICG~~
~~Declassify On: 20441231~~

Hi [redacted]

b6
b7C

I actually remember turning over my original notes for the file for this (it was right at the beginning of the case). I gave them to [redacted] who was running the file then. The only question will be whether or not I kept a copy for myself. I'll look and see what I have.

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2019 10:31 AM
To: [redacted] (OCIO) (FBI); [redacted]
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: FW: MYE Serial #?? --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: F58M22K55~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSICG~~
~~Declassify On: 20441231~~

Hey [redacted]

b6
b7C

I know this is a shot in the dark, but do you still have the meeting notes that you wrote up concerning an 8/3/2015 MRE meeting at FBIHQ? I think [redacted] correct me if I'm wrong) that this meeting was with the ICIG, if that helps matters.

We are trying to sure up the MYE case file/1As, and unfortunately it looks like 1A4 - described in Sentinel as your notes from this meeting - never made it to the file. Check out the below serial to refresh your memory, as recalling a meeting for three and half years ago is likely beyond possible.

HRC-13836

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

I hope all is well.

Thanks,

[redacted]

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2019 9:54 AM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI) [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
[redacted]
Subject: RE: MYE Serial #?? --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: W33W96P68~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSICG~~
~~Declassify On: 20441231~~

Serial 44, 1A 4. Thank you!!

SA [redacted]

b6
b7C

WFO CI-13

[redacted] office

[redacted] cell

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2019 8:00 AM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI) [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
[redacted]
Subject: MYE Serial #?? --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: F58M22K55~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSICG~~
~~Declassify On: 20441231~~

What serial number are you looking for? I'll hit up [redacted] and ask him about it.

b6
b7C

HRC-13837

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property

Case ID: _____

On (date) 7-21-2016

item(s) listed below were:

- ☐ Collected/Seized
☐ Received From
☐ Returned To
☒ Released To

(Name) _____

(Street Address) US Department of State / Diplomatic Security(City) Washington DC

Description of Item (s): 1 DVD titled "Final Production to U.S. Dept of State
Disc 1; Datasets 1-3 " Lab Number 150302352 & Disc # DEH075
1 DVD titled "Final Classification Determinations" Lab #
Number 1-0302350 & Disc # DEH075

b6
b7Cb6
b7C

HRC-13841

Received By: _____

Received From: _____

Printed Name/Title: _____

Printed Name/Title: _____

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b7C

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FOI/PA# 1353814-0

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